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ABSTRACT 
Local emergency planners are creating mass prophylaxis plans to prophylax entire 
populations within forty eight hours in order to reduce mortality after a bioterrorist attack.  
The Points of Dispensing (PODs) used in prophylaxis are central to an area’s mass 
prophylaxis plans, but they are insufficient because of their staffing and security 
constraints.  Several alternate modes of dispensing that have similar attributes and are 
considered best practices are presently being implemented in local health departments 
(LHDs). The purpose of this thesis is to develop models to evaluate alternate modes of 
dispensing using multi-attribute value function (MAVF), an approach that supports multi-
attribute decision-making by taking into account the trade-offs a decision-maker is 
willing to make between attributes. Two models are created for  Los Angeles County 
(LAC).  The models showed that in LAC, the door-to-door option, pharmacy option, civil 
service option and Kaiser Permanente option work best.  The study finds that alternate 
modes of dispensing can be useful in filling the gaps in the POD-based approach by 
increasing critical resources or lowering the pressure on existing resources.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. RISING THREATS OF BIOTERRORISM, RESURGENCE OF 
INFECTIOUS DISEASES AND THE IMPORTANCE OF PUBLIC 
HEALTH 
The anthrax and Salmonellaosis attacks in the United States, sarin attacks in 
Japan, and nerve and mustard gas attacks on the Kurds in Iraq have shown that civilian 
populations worldwide are vulnerable to terrorist attacks involving bacterial pathogens, 
lethal toxins, and chemical agents (Torok, Tauxe, & Wise, 1997; Okumura, Suzuki & 
Fukuda, 1998; Lee, 2003; Tucker, 1996).    Reports that the Soviet Union ran the largest 
covert biological and chemical weapons program in the world have been uncovered 
(Davis, C.J., 1999).  At the same time, several reports stating that military bioweapons 
arsenals that have been missing since the fall of the Soviet Union and scientists are 
unaccounted for raise the possibility that terrorists may have access to trained scientist 
and highly dangerous agents that have been engineered for mass dissemination as 
aerosols (Alibek, 1999). Instructions for preparing biological and chemical agents are 
readily available online (Fester, 1997). Biological agents can be highly contagious and 
fatal, requiring a timely response to avoid economic loss, loss of life and large-scale 
panic. 
A bioterrorist attack of the type or scale described above would likely have a 
devastating effect on some portion of the U.S. population. Public health response plans 
are based on mass prophylaxis of their population.  In order for LHDs to successfully 
mass-prophylax their population they would require “… rapid mobilization of public 
health workers, emergency responders, and private health-care providers…” as well as 
“rapid procurement, distribution and dispensing of large quantities of drugs and vaccines, 
which must be available quickly.” (CDC Strategic Planning Work Group, 2000) 
B. THE STRATEGIC NATIONAL STOCKPILE PROGRAM 
Starting with President Clinton’s Executive Order 12938 in 1994 the funding for 
bioterrorism initiatives has increased significantly (Executive Order 12938, 1994).  Ten 
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years later in 2004, President George W. Bush signed Homeland Security Presidential 
Directive 10 to strengthen the nation’s preparedness and defense against the use of 
biological and chemical weapons (Homeland Security Presidential Directive #10, 2004).  
This Presidential directive also created a new role for public health within the intelligence 
community and as a first responder. 
The Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) and the Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) established the National Pharmaceutical Stockpile 
(NPS) as a resource for all states and urban areas (Public Health Training Network, 
2006).  The Strategic National Stockpile (SNS) was created from the NPS as a national 
repository of antibiotics, chemical antidotes, antitoxins, vaccines, medical equipment and 
supplies to combat "Category A" Threat Agents as defined by the CDC (Los Angeles 
County Operational Area, 2005a).  At the same time the SNS also contains life-saving 
equipment such as respirators and N95 masks (CDC - Division of Strategic National 
Stockpile, 2006).  The mission of the SNS is to help state and local jurisdictions prepare a 
strategic and uniform response to a large-scale natural disaster or an act of terrorism 
(CDC - Division of Strategic National Stockpile, 2006).  States with a small population 
have the ability to obtain sufficient stockpiles of antibiotics, immunoglobulin, 
neutralizing agents and antitoxins by directly setting up contracts with pharmaceutical 
distributors (Public Health Training Network, 2006).  Very few states have elected to do 
so, however, because of the costs associated with maintenance, storage and cycling of 
expired medications. States like New York and California with large urban populations 
would have difficulty obtaining a contract for mass prophylaxis of their general 
populations to begin with. 
If a state does establish a contract and order prophylactic supplies from the CDC, 
the SNS may arrive by ground or by air; its delivery is a federal responsibility and force 
protection is provided by the United States Marshall Service (USMS).  Once the SNS has 
arrived at a predesignated and secure warehouse (and signed over to the state) the asset 
becomes a state responsibility.  The state would be responsible for distributing the SNS 
assets to the local jurisdictions.  There are designated urban areas like the New York 
Metropolitan Area, Washington D.C., and the LAC Operational Area where the SNS 
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assets may arrive directly at the local warehouse (a state representative must still be 
present to sign for the receipt for the SNS assets).  LHDs (City and County Public Health 
Departments) are responsible for dispensing the SNS assets to the general public (Los 
Angeles County Operational Area, 2005a).   
Since the 2001 anthrax attacks and the influenza season of 2003, combined with 
the failure of Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), state, and local response 
efforts during hurricane Katrina, the focus has shifted back from federal response 
capability to the ability of state and local public health authorities to provide timely and 
reliable access to prophylactic medications (Jernigan, J., Stephens, D., & Ashford, D.  
2001; Webby, R.J., Webster, R. G., 2003).  The CDC has therefore called on all states 
and LHDs to devise a comprehensive mass prophylaxis plan to ensure that the general 
population has timely access to antibiotics and/or vaccines in the event of future terrorist 
attacks or natural outbreaks (CDC, 2002). 
The CDC created the concept of ‘PODs’ as a mechanism for dispensing medicine 
and medical supplies to the general population during a large-scale public health 
emergency (CDC, 2002).  Prophylactic drugs and personal protective equipment (PPE) 
would be dispensed and vaccines administered at the PODs, or non-clinical sites such as 
sport stadiums and convention centers. Such an operation at non-clinical sites would 
ensure that treatment centers would be able to continue treating their existing patients as 
well as anyone who is symptomatic or injured from the emergency.   
Prophylaxis of the entire population should be conducted within forty eight hours, 
as some agents such as smallpox and strains of pandemic influenza are extremely virulent 
and contagious; others such as anthrax have a very small incubation period with deaths 
resulting within forty eight hours (Chen, 2005).  Mass prophylaxis within forty eight 
hours also improves public safety by avoiding or minimizing the potential for riots and 
civil disorder. 
C. OVERVIEW OF THE PROBLEM 
PODs are central to an area’s emergency response and mass prophylaxis plans, 
but they are not sufficient and are in fact problematic in many ways. Most major 
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metropolitan areas have large populations that would require prophylaxis within forty 
eight hours as required by the CDC Guidance for SNS Planners.  CDC does provide an 
algorithm to determine how many sites would be required during a worst-case scenario, 
but in heavily populated metropolitan areas the number of sites required for such an 
operation becomes too large for mass prophylaxis based solely on PODs. This is because 
it is difficult for emergency planners to find facilities that are not already designated for 
other functions during an emergency such as a shelter, quarantine, alternate medical 
facility, etc.  At the same time finding a site located in or near heavily populated areas 
becomes much more difficult.  Creating preplans for PODs is very complicated as it 
requires coordinated input from public health, law enforcement and fire departments to 
analyze traffic patterns to avoid bottlenecks and gridlocks (something major metropolitan 
areas are plagued by), finding appropriate parking, access to public transportation and 
handicap access. PODs are volunteer-dependent and require large staffing capacities in 
major metropolitan areas.  
For these reasons, coordination is critical and at times extremely complicated. 
Having a large number of PODs strains law enforcement resources due to security 
concerns, strains the transportation resources that supply PODs with the SNS, which once 
again adds strain on law enforcement resources as more vehicles on the road means more 
security vehicles. Finally, the complex structures of government organizations and their 
relationships with each other and the private sector makes the MOU process very 
complicated and time-consuming, delaying POD planning and mass prophylaxis plans.  
In short, emergency planners in the major metropolitan areas must focus on 
alternate modes of dispensing to relieve the pressure on PODs if they are to successfully 
respond to a large scale terrorist attack or face a natural disaster the size of Hurricane 
Katrina.  
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
During the post-9/11 era there is a significant amount of literature available that 
emphasizes the threat faced by the civilian population in the United States from 
bioterrorism.  This threat became harsh reality after the anthrax attacks using the United 
States Postal Service (USPS).  According to Milton Leitenberg’s book, Assessing the 
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Biological Weapons and Bioterrorism Threat, the U.S. military forces found significant 
evidence that al-Qaeda had spent several years trying to obtain the “knowledge and 
means of production” to produce biological weapons.  
There is very little formally written literature on alternate modes of dispensing.  
Most studies indicate a clear need to explore alternate modes of dispensing, but most 
state and local plans do not spell out what these alternate modes are, nor have most of 
them ever been tested.  The most important resource to find alternate modes of 
dispensing being considered or tested by other jurisdictions has been the SNS List Serve, 
an online discussion forum where individuals working closely with SNS issues post their 
thoughts and comments as well as questions.   
One frequent problem is that there are no specific guidelines listed by any 
jurisdiction to formally evaluate the effectiveness of their alternate mode of dispensing.  
The most that is analyzed is how many people are processed through the system within 
an hour.  This information is quite important, but so is evaluating how it contributes to 
the POD process, whether it reduces the impact of crowding or the strain on staffing 
resources, and so on.   
A comparative analysis was performed by Mr. Chester Lee Smith to understand 
how involving business in dispensing of drugs during a mass prophylaxis event would 
reduce the stress on PODs.  The paper compared the use of business PODs, regular 
PODs, USPS and a combination of all three options using the strategy canvas developed 
by W. Chan Kim and Renee Mauborgne in Blue Ocean Strategies, which allows decision 
makers to understand “current status of activities to be captured against a range of factors 
associated with performance within a given industry” visually represented by a value 
curve (Smith, 2007).  This curve shows the relative performance of an option based on 
the selected factors (Chan & Mauborgne, 2007).  Value cures were generated for each of 
the four policy options being considered.   
E. RESEARCH QUESTION  
1. How can alternate modes of dispensing be quantitatively evaluated for their 
efficiency during an event requiring oral prophylaxis? 
And 
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2. Which mode of alternate dispensing would be most efficient in the LAC to 
address oral prophylaxis of the entire population based on our quantitative 
analysis?   
F. TENTATIVE SOLUTION 
The solution to the problems related to prophylaxing a large population identified 
in the problem statement above is a very practical one: finding alternate modes of 
dispensing.  There are several alternate modes of dispensing that have been tested or 
planned that could be applicable to other jurisdictions.  Some alternate modes of 
dispensing are very efficient in terms of numbers of people that can be reached, the speed 
of dispensing and staffing requirements as well as security.   
Qualitative analysis cannot directly assess the efficiency of these alternate modes 
of dispensing, and currently there is no significant tool to quantitatively assess the 
efficiency of PODs. The first step would be therefore to select successful alternate modes 
of dispensing and then create a tool to analyze their efficiency in terms of staffing, 
security and speed/number of people reached.   
G. SUMMARY OF ALTERNATE MODES OF DISPENSING 
The pre-positioning approach is currently in practice in several jurisdictions and 
has helped them meet the challenges of procuring resources during an emergency.  
Having a local stockpile to prophylax their POD staff as well as hospital, fire, EMS and 
law enforcement personnel and their families could be a huge advantage, since personnel 
essential during a mass prophylaxis event could be prophylaxed before the SNS arrives.  
Drugs can be purchased with funds from a number of federal grants, though the local 
jurisdiction would have to bear the cost of rotating the drugs (Public Health Training 
Network, 2006).  This process is being used in LAC with great success. 
The health department in Orange County, Florida, seems to have had great 
success with its business PODs, with which it plans to prophylax 40% of the population.  
Memoranda of Agreement (MOA) with large employers would ask employers to 
prophylax their own staff and families of staffs (Crow, 2007a).   
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The Sheltered in Populations (SIPS) plan tested in Oklahoma has been very 
successful.  The plan targets populations in jails, assisted living facilities, nursing homes 
and hospice who may be unable to come to PODs. During the exercise personnel 
dispensed 50,000 doses in three hours using only nine nurses and minimal security.  The 
success has been so great that Oklahoma City/County Health Department is planning to 
expand the program in phases to include other groups, such as colleges and universities 
that had initially been left out (Public Health Training Network, 2006). 
The city of Las Vegas is, like Los Angeles, a high-priority target.  The city of Las 
Vegas plans to deliver medication to hotels, which seems to be a very reasonable strategy 
(Aherns, 2004).  Las Vegas must, for obvious economic reasons, be able to care for its 
large tourist populations.  MOAs have been signed between the resorts and the health 
department, but the plan has not been tested as it has been difficult to close a section of a 
resort for an exercise. 
Denver, Colorado, has built a successful relationship with Kaiser Permanente, 
through which Kaiser would operate PODs using its staff to prophylax all staff members 
and their families.  Kaiser organizes drive-thru flu clinics during the flu seasons and it 
therefore has experience dealing with PODs. This approach alleviates significant pressure 
from other PODs. 
The most important discussion for rapid delivery within forty eight hours has been 
around the use of USPS employees.  The USPS has route information and delivers mail 
to virtually every household in its assigned area daily (GAO, 2004).  This makes it the 
most efficient alternate dispensing option when the agent is anthrax and the only 
prophylaxis is doxycycline.  An agreement is already in place between the USPS, 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the DHHS for USPS workers to deliver 
medications door-to-door during an emergency (Los Angeles County Operational Area, 
2005b).  However, the USPS’s 1:1 security demand has held up planning in several 
jurisdictions.  For example, in the State of Rhode Island where crime and mob rule is 
relatively low, the terms of such a contract are easy to agree upon; in Los Angeles, where 
there is a history of crime and riots, the postal workers union demands one-on-one 
protection for all postal workers. 
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A popular concept has been drive-through PODs. Originally when the idea of 
using them emerged from the Hawaii State Exercise in 2004 it received a lukewarm 
response. But since the application of this strategy to drive-through flu clinics, it has been 
the leading alternate mode of dispensing after alternate delivery.  There are still critics on 
both sides of the debate, however: for example, the influenza exercise in Colorado was 
successful and it was quickly decided that a drive-through POD would be a part of any 
alternate dispensing strategy (Lehman, 2004).  On the other hand, in Ohio the drive-
through clinic led to a huge traffic back-up (Iiames, 2004). 
Dr. Onora Lien interviewed executives from various grocery stores, retail 
pharmacies, and wholesale chain pharmacies, and they unanimously endorsed the idea of 
planning for and responding to a bioterrorist event.  Although these chains are for-profit 
companies they identified a strong bond with their community: “Nearly all retail 
executives acknowledged that doing the ‘right thing’ for the community and the nation 
would be the ‘right thing’ for their business in the long run.” (Lien, 2006) 
H. METHOD 
MAVF is an approach that supports multiple criteria decision-making by taking 
into account the trade-offs a decision-maker is willing to make between attributes 
(Belton, 2002).  The process reveals and documents decision-makers’ preferences and 
easily determines their points of disagreements; at the same time it can perform marginal 
and sensitivity analysis rapidly under a variety of scenarios.   
Identification of the measurable criteria that would define a strong alternate 
dispensing option is critical for successful analysis.  Most alternate modes of dispensing 
fall into one of two categories: modes that dispense to the general public (Model A) and 
modes that dispense to a specific subset of the general population (Model B).  In the 
former model, speed is an important attribute replaced in the latter model by the number 
of people that can be reached (since the mode would have a finite cap).  Assessment of 
security and staffing requirements are common to both models.  Staffing is assessed as 
percent staff reduction by comparing the staffing requirement of the option to that of the 
baseline (POD staffing in a given jurisdiction).  Percent staff reduction has two sub-
components, percent clinical staff reduction and percent non-clinical staff reduction.  
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Security assessment is determined by a committee of experts in mass prophylaxis and 
security on a scale of 1-10, where one is the lowest security requirement and ten is the 
highest. The security assessment has two sub-components, site security and transportation 
security. All three criteria influence the final decision as to which alternate mode of 
dispensing is most viable.  For example, an alternate dispensing option may be very 
efficient in terms of its speed but may have very high security demands, making that 
option unavailable.   
The weights for each criterion to analyze a decision maker’s preference are set by 
a committee comprised of experts from Public Health, Emergency Medical Services 
(EMS), Law Enforcement and Fire Departments.   
Decision makers must list all possible alternate modes of dispensing they plan to 
analyze and describe in significant detail how each mode may be implemented in their 
jurisdiction.  The data for each alternate mode of dispensing are collected through careful 
review of journal articles, attendance at exercises as evaluators, after-action reports and 
information available online.  The information is entered into an Excel spreadsheet along 
with assessed weights to perform MAVF. The Excel tool will provide a quantitative basis 
for selecting an alternate mode of dispensing, though it does not account for 
political/external complications present in the metropolitan area.   
I. SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH 
With the rising threat of bioterrorism the nation needs to be prepared for a mass 
prophylaxis response.  The CDC’s model of mass prophylaxis states that PODs will be 
the cornerstone of any operation, but the CDC also admits that in a worst-case scenario 
PODs will not be enough, and alternate modes of dispensing would be required.  Several 
public health jurisdictions at state and local levels have invested time and resources 
designing alternate modes of dispensing tailored for their population and based on 
available resources.  However, there are no concrete overarching studies that analyze 
speed of dispensing, total numbers that can be reached in forty eight hours, staffing 
requirements, cost and security for various alternate mode of dispensing through formal 
statistical analysis.  This research will rely on a multi-objective decision analysis, a well-
established tool in decision analysis and operations research, to analyze which alternate 
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mode of dispensing would be the most valuable during a mass prophylaxis event.  The 
study’s primary audiences are local and state SNS and Mass Prophylaxis coordinators as 
well as SNS reviewers/advisors at the CDC and DHHS. 
J. OVERVIEW OF CHAPTERS 
This thesis is organized into ten chapters to address this policy question.  This 
chapter has provided an overview of the importance of Public Health in bioterrorism 
events, the background of the SNS, an overview of the problem, a review of literature 
related to the problem, a tentative solution, a summary of alternate modes of dispensing, 
a discussion of the methodology, the significance of the research and the overview of 
chapters in the thesis.  Chapter II provides an in-depth analysis of the problems facing the 
POD-based approach to mass prophylaxis, and looks at problems associated with exercise 
data, finding suitable POD sites, challenges related to staff procurement, coordination, 
training and care for their families, security challenges, traffic control challenges, issues 
related to dealing with special needs population and cyber security.  Chapter III provides 
a description of the POD-based approach and nine alternate modes of dispensing.  
Chapter IV provides the methodology used to analyze our modes of dispensing.  Chapter 
V provides an overview of the geo-political structure of LAC and then applies the model 
described in Chapter IV to LAC and explains how numbers were derived.  Chapter VI 
provides the results of our analysis.  Chapter VII discusses the uncertainty of data in 
Model A and Model B and determines that the results obtained in Chapter VII are robust 
and applicable.  The chapter also provides a discussion on the acceptability of results, 
pitfalls that LHDs must consider as they develop portfolios of various options, 
considerations with respect to the special needs population, and ensuring that the gaps left 
behind by the POD-based approach are addressed by the alternate modes of dispensing.  
Finally, this chapter identifies barriers and solutions to implementation of the results, 
provides a scope for future research, and presents the conclusion of this research. 
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II. POD-BASED DISPENSING AND CHALLENGES 
A. TRADITIONAL MODES OF DISPENSING - THE PODS 
The POD-based approach was created by the CDC to ensure that prophylactic 
medications were dispensed to the community safely.  PODs typically serve three major 
functions: They prevent the hospital system from becoming overwhelmed; they separate 
the symptomatic individuals from the general population under medical supervision; and 
they can bring together a large number of people for mass prophylaxis so that scarce 
resources such as staffing and security can be concentrated at designated locations 
(Hupert, 2004).  The DHHS introduced the PODs approach as the most fundamental 
approach to mass prophylaxis.  PODs have two modes: “OPEN,” providing prophylaxis 
to the general population as seen during exercises such as TOPOFF 3 in New Jersey, or 
“CLOSED,” providing prophylaxis to a specific segment of the general population, as in 
New York in the aftermath of the anthrax attacks (Government Accountability Office, 
2004).   
The CDC recommends that PODs be sites that the community is familiar with 
such as sports arenas, convention centers, community centers, and, in some cases, 
schools.  This is because they are usually located in areas with high population density  
and easy access, ample parking, and close to public transportation facilities (City of Los 
Angeles, 2006).  These sites are typically climate controlled.  Local law enforcement is 
usually familiar with them and has practices to securing them.  Facility preplans that 
denote all major rooms, entrances and exits as well as the site layout during the POD 
operations should be laid out in advance.  Unless a facility is owned by LHDs, they 
would require a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with the facility owners to ensure 
that the facility will be available during an emergency.   
Core operations at a POD, as recommended by the Weill Medical College of 
Cornell University, involve greeting, forms distribution, triage, medical evaluation, 
transportation assistance, transportation assistance, mental health evaluation, briefing, 
dispensing and form collections (Agency for Health Care Research and Quality, 2006).  
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These are called core functions as they directly influence dispensing of drugs.  Support 
functions at PODs include drug re-supply, line monitors, data entry, translation services, 
IT support, food services, facility maintenance and security (Agency for Health Care 
Research and Quality, 2006).  However, the number of functions performed at each POD 
will depend on the availability of staff and needs of the target population.  Some 
functions may be performed in conjunction with others at a single station.  There are 
several clinical layouts that have been established by the Weill Medical College of 
Cornell University’s Department of Public Health (DPH) (Hupert, 2004).  The clinical 
layout chosen by each jurisdiction would depend on the targeted flow rate, staff 
availability, security availability and the physical layout of the POD site itself.   
POD communication and management would be based on the Incident Command 
System (ICS).  There are several advantages to managing a POD using ICS principles: it 
enforces the use of common language and it reduces duplication of work and improves 
efficiency (State of California, 2004).  Each site would be required to have a designated 
POD site manager, a public information officer, a safety officer, and liaison officer.  
These individuals form the POD management staff (State of Califorina, 2004).  The 
running of a POD requires two types of personnel – medical staff responsible for 
dispensing and non-medical staff responsible for support functions.  A summary for this 
structure for LAC is provided in Figure 1 (Los Angeles County Department of Public 
Health, 2007).  
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Figure 1.   Points of Dispensing – Incident Command Structure.  Originally published in the 






















Estimating staff requirements for all these functions is challenging.  The 
Bioterrorism and Epidemic Outbreak Response Model (BERM) version 2.0 recently 
created by researchers at the Weill Medical College of Cornell University helps planners 
predict the total number of staff and the number working in each work group required for 
a successful mass prophylaxis campaign for a given population.  The software allows the 
selection of population size, duration of the campaign, number of shifts and hours of 
operation, type and scale of the event, and the anticipated flow rate, and provides 
estimates of support and core staff required at each site.  The system also allows the 
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planner to limit the staffing input and see the estimated effects it would have on the POD 
campaign.  Using these estimates, planners should test their POD staffing and throughput 
model to obtain accurate staffing estimates. 
B. CHALLENGES FACING POD BASED MASS PROPHYLAXIS 
In its third annual report, Ready or Not? Protecting the Public’s Health from 
Disease, Disasters and Bioterrorism, the Trust for America’s Health determined that we 
are significantly under-prepared to respond to a bioterrorism event in the United States.  
The panel noted that 85% of states received a score lower than six on a 1–10 scale; the 
federal government also received a failing grade as related to activities dealing with 
bioterrorism preparedness and response (Trust for America’s Health, 2006).  Public 
Health agencies were put in charge by the federal government to lead bioterrorism 
preparedness and response activities.  But as seen during the smallpox campaign, there 
was a shortage of medical personnel to mass-vaccinate the public during an emergency 
(Mitchell, 2005).  This was because Public Health agencies do not have the infrastructure 
required for mass prophylaxis (Santiago, 2006). 
Comprehensive mass prophylaxis plans are based on PODs, which would serve as 
a mechanism for dispensing medicine and medical supplies to individuals in the area of 
risk during a large-scale public health emergency. Mass prophylaxis coordination 
requires advance planning and integration of staffing, security, traffic and control plans to 
successfully respond to the incident (Whitmore, 2005).  Each of these processes is 
interdependent and affects the efficiency of the others.  For example, if POD throughput 
is not fast enough due to insufficient staff, then security will be at risk of being overrun, 
there will be a gridlock in the parking lots and an overflow of traffic on access roads that 
will limit the ability of clients to get to the POD.   
While the official standard for mass prophylaxis is PODs, there has been much 
discussion of their potential failure modes.  Practically all exercises done using PODs 
proclaim themselves wonderful successes.  While this is not an unexpected result given 
political pressures, it hides many potential issues that may negatively impact how well a 
county is able to meet prophylaxis standards in actuality.  This chapter presents highlights 
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of some of the difficulties.  When alternate modes of prophylaxis are considered, they 
should be chosen so as not to worsen these situations or duplicate the same failure modes. 
1. Problems with Exercise Data 
Several exercises in the U.S. have tested POD models. However, most of these 
exercises have been functional exercises that test only a single component of mass 
prophylaxis.  All exercises are very well-planned, using professional contractors who 
provide scripts of a predetermined agent and sufficient and pre-designated POD staff who 
are generally trained in advance.  Exercises are often criticized for not introducing 
“surprise elements or contradictory information” to analyze reactions of the POD staff 
and managers (Lioy, 2005).  Exercises typically have a limited number of people being 
rotated through the POD on a continuous basis for a few hours.  During an event, LHDs 
may not have pre-trained staff and they may not work efficiently throughout a twelve-
hour shift.  People coming to the site will be confused, concerned and anxious and may 
not be compliant.  Therefore the throughput obtained from the exercises may not 
represent throughput during an actual event. 
Most exercises do not provide accurate estimates on the set-up period prior to 
POD operations.  Precisely because exercises are well planned, it becomes very difficult 
to anticipate the time requirement from identification of an agent to assessment of the 
impact, and activation of mass prophylaxis plans to set-up of the PODs, organization of  
staff and launch of mass prophylaxis.   
Exercises also fail to capture the sense of chaos among the general public and 
fuelled by the media; above all, they fail to capture how an agency would locate and 
organize its staff and volunteers amid the brewing chaos (Lioy, 2005).  Finally, POD 
exercises often lack a security component as it is hard to justify full security staffing for 
an exercise.   
POD operations require coordination and robust communication between PODs, 




need for resources.  But it is very rare that all three components are exercised at the same 
time.  It is hard to test communication at exercises due to a casual approach by POD staff 
during exercises (Lioy, 2005).   
2. Finding PODs 
CDC recommends that PODs have very specific physical characteristics (City of 
Los Angeles, 2004).  Based on these recommendations there may not be enough sites 
within the geographic boundaries of a LHD to serve as PODs.  Difficulties may still arise 
due to the social stigma attached to bioterrorism events or liability issues for damage to 
the facility.   
3. POD Staffing Challenges 
Due to state and local budget constraints most LHDs are understaffed to run their 
daily functions (Flynn, 2004).  Exactly how many staff are needed is unknown, as 
demand at each site is variable and unpredictable.  Models suggest large staffing 
requirements, making the process completely dependent on volunteers (Trust for 
America’s Health, 2005; Los Angeles County, 2006).   
a. POD Staff Procurement 
Since mass prophylaxis is volunteer-dependent, staff procurement 
becomes a troubling issue.  The forty-eight-hour deadline to prophylax the entire general 
population puts a heavy burden on PODs, especially when LHDs estimate they would 
require at least twenty four hours to contact and recruit their POD staff and set up POD 
operations and security.  This puts great constraint on the time available to procure 
volunteers.  The POD staffing resources consist of volunteers and staff from various 
departments within the local agency as well as other partner agencies. For example, a 
county will use its own staff as well as staff from cities within its boundaries; this in itself 
could lead to staffing complications unless there is marked delineation of duties between 
cities and the county (Los Angeles County Operation Chimera, 2005a). Nevertheless, a 
large percentage of PODs would be volunteer-driven and getting a workforce large 
enough to staff PODs for two twelve-hour shifts per day could become challenging.  
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Most LHDs concede that they will not be able to set up and operate all PODs at once and 
PODs would be opened based on availability of staffing and security resources.  This 
would once again put great strain on PODs already open as people from neighboring and 
distant cities may pour in to obtain prophylaxis.  
LHDs need to set up registries that can register, credential clinical staff 
and ideally train POD staff, a time-consuming and expensive process.  Choosing not to 
do so could divert crucial resources required for mass prophylaxis during an event.  
Spontaneous volunteers arriving at PODs would add to the traffic congestion and would 
negatively influence POD operations.  Maintaining updated staff call-down procedures 
and designating a reporting location such as a staging area will help, but may not be 
adequate because of uncertainties to do with travel impediments or personal obligations.   
b. POD Staff Coordination 
Coordinating spontaneous volunteers and LHD staff with PODs based on 
shifts and needs should be well coordinated.  The lack of a pre-planned staging area for 
staff to gather can result in “flocking” at undesirable locations, such as PODs, hospitals 
and other healthcare facilities (Los Angeles County Operation Chimera, 2005b), resulting 
in compromised care, uncoordinated staffing efforts, and over- or under-staffing.  This 
makes a strong case for a staging area for personnel (City of Los Angeles, 2004).  The 
need for coordination would dip into valuable resources as a staging center itself would 
require staffing and security.   
Planning breaks for staff and changing shifts should be well coordinated in 
order to prevent disruption and thereby slow down throughput.   
c. POD Staff Families 
Public health agencies are sending a mixed message to potential POD 
staff.  The general public is told to come to PODs to receive prophylactic treatment 
within forty eight hours, indicating a significant threat to public health.  POD staff, to the 
contrary, are told they can take medications back to their loved ones after a twelve-hour 
shift at a POD.  This conflicting message creates a huge dilemma for volunteers who are 
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told they will receive medications for themselves and their families if they work at a 
POD.  It may be much more expeditious for the potential volunteer to go to a POD and 
stand in line for up to four hours to obtain medications for themselves and their families.   
There may be problems associated with the willingness of POD staff to 
stay for a twelve-hour shift, and this is not isolated to volunteer staff.  The staff belonging 
to LHDs – as well as other city and county staff - may also be unwilling to stay at a POD 
for a twelve-hour shift because of dependent care obligations that PODs themselves 
would be unable to meet (Trust for America’s Health).  POD staff will not report for duty 
unless they have been assured that they and their families are safe; anything less will 
result in staffing shortages and absenteeism. 
d. POD Staff Training 
POD volunteers would require “just-in-time” training in communication, 
ICS and the POD process.  Training staff on the use of radios and understanding ICS 
takes time, but not doing so would lead to a breakdown in communication (Los Angeles 
County Emergency Preparedness and Response Program, 2006).  A lack of familiarity 
among volunteers with the chain of command established under ICS can lead to delays, 
as they do not understand how to report problems through proper channels and how to 
order supplies (Los Angeles County Operation Chimera, 2005c).  A breakdown in 
communication can result in duplication of efforts; resource requests and gaps in 
operations affect the efficiency of PODs, resulting in a slower throughput (Los Angeles 
County Operation Chimera, 2005b).  
Since POD staff receives only just-in-time training for the POD process, 
misunderstood instructions can lead to disruption of POD operations.  However, 
increasing the time spent on such training can result in delayed opening of PODs.  The 
CDC-developed algorithm used during triage is complicated and requires time to 
properly understand it and be able to implement it.  Computer-based systems like the 
inventory management system or patient tracking systems require advance training.  
Although all PODs in a given jurisdiction may have a standard floor plan, the entry and 
exit points as well as queuing and setup of stations may be different from site to site.  
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When POD staff arrives for their shift there may not be enough time to familiarize them 
with the POD setup and operations during an emergency.  Without a clear understanding 
of the POD flow, layout and set up valuable time is wasted, affecting POD efficiency.   
In case of a contagious disease it may be very difficult to properly train 
POD staff to adhere to PPE compliance guidelines.  POD staff may feel uncomfortable 
wearing them or choose to wear them sporadically (New Jersey Domestic Security Task 
Force, 2005).  Fit-testing each staff with PPE may also pose a challenge as it can be time 
consuming, but not doing so could potentially put them in harm’s way and discourage 
others from volunteering. 
4. Security Issues 
A major strength of PODs is that they bring a large number of people together for 
rapid prophylaxis to a few designated locations; this is, ironically, also their potential 
vulnerability.  After a bioterrorism event there is an atmosphere of uncertainty and 
confusion.  Since PODs are large facilities that will attract a large number of people, they 
can be optimal targets for terrorists.  A bombing at such a facility would cause a large 
number of fatalities from the initial attack and many more during the stampede that 
would follow as people tried to flee the facility.  PODs could become the secondary 
targets; since they provide terrorists with an “optimal” combination of mass casualty and 
mass media exposure, they should therefore be considered a high-value, high-payoff 
target (Los Angeles County Operation Chimera, 2005d).  An attack at such a facility 
would discourage potential staff from volunteering to work at PODs and discourage 
people from going to them.  POD security also faces internal threats from gang activities 
(rival gangs meeting at a POD), people cutting in line and general public insubordination, 
which could lead to rioting.   
The cumulative needs of securing several POD locations, local hospitals, and a 
panicked public will stretch the combined strength of all law enforcement to its limit. 





such as conducting criminal investigations and maintaining civil order.  It is possible to 
get military support, but it may take National Guard troops up to two days to arrive 
(Mitchell, 2005).   
Several SNS plans have determined that because of the potential for panic and 
civil disorder as well as the perception of having a limited supply of pharmaceuticals 
available to the public, security at PODs is critical and it would be most effective if a 
single agency were responsible for coordinating this function (Los Angeles County 
Operation Chimera, 2005a).  However, in larger counties such as Los Angeles, the 
several major police departments and County Sheriff’s department would need to 
coordinate and put aside politics for the duration of the campaign. 
5. Traffic Control 
Since PODs are generally large facilities and located within population centers 
there are obvious traffic control considerations – this is especially the case in geographic 
areas without significant mass transportation systems and a high population density. 
Roads could be overwhelmed with a large number of cars converging on the location.  
Managing parking would also be a challenge and security would be required in parking 
lots to prevent potential conflicts.  People walking through parking lots also pose a 
challenge as this can lead to accidents that slow traffic and require ambulance response.  
LHDs require strong traffic control plans to manage the events outside the POD to ensure 
that operations inside run smoothly. 
6. Special Needs Population 
There is a debate about how PODs should deal with the special needs population.  
People with special needs may not be able to wait in long lines for hours to receive their 
medications and may not have a family member to do it for them.  If they are placed in 
regular lines this could adversely affect throughput.  Some LHDs have suggested moving 
them to the front of the line but that could lead to conflict with people already waiting in 
long lines.  Others have suggested having a special line for delivery to special needs, but 
this may lead to ethical violations.  Critics of both approaches believe that LHDs are 
placing too much emphasis on these minority populations (Lioy, 2005).  Nevertheless, a 
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lack of equal care can result in psychological damage to the community and disruption of 
POD operations, and open LHDs to legal actions (Los Angeles County Operation 
Chimera, 2005c).   
Due to these problems it is vital that LHDs explore alternate modes of 
prophylaxis to supplement the PODs.  The alternate modes of dispensing need to be able 
to address the shortcomings of the POD without exacerbating the issues highlighted in 
















THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 
 23
III. ALTERNATE MODES OF DISPENSING 
Many LHDs find it extremely difficult to prophylax their entire population within 
forty eight hours using only their PODs because of staffing, security and site availability 
concerns.  LHDs could open more PODs but this would not resolve the issue because the 
number of PODs is directly correlated to the requisite number of resources.  LHDs could 
increase the throughput at each site but this has the same limitations, as the throughput is 
directly correlated to the amount of resources required.  Considering that resources will 
always be under pressure it becomes necessary for Public Health officials to consider 
alternate modes of dispensing (Public Health Training Network, 2006).  
Although the DHHS still views PODs as the cornerstone of dispensing during a 
bioterrorism event requiring oral prophylaxis, additional alternate methods of dispensing 
would be required to prophylax the entire population of a larger jurisdiction within forty 
eight hours.  This is because PODs are limited by resource availability and during an 
emergency LHDs may not be able to acquire all resources they need to prophylax their 
population fast enough.  Alternate methods of dispensing are meant to complement PODs 
as they reduce the number of people who need to be moved through PODs (Public Health 
Training Network, 2006).  The CDC recommends several alternate modes of dispensing 
that have shown to be best practices and there are several other alternate modes of 
dispensing that are regularly discussed on the SNS listserv hosted by the CDC.  Nine 
major alternate modes of dispensing will be discussed in this paper; some are based on 
the “pull” model (people must come to a given location to collect their medications) and 
others on the “push” model (prophylactic medications are pushed out to where people are 
located).  The CDC states that in order to create a robust alternate mode of dispensing 
LHDs need to first identify the population that it would serve, research the availability of 
resources, and create a strong partnership with stakeholders (Public Health Training 
Network, 2006).  Since the problems associated with alternate modes of dispensing are 
unique, they are best analyzed for their efficiency at the local level. 
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A. PRE-POSITIONING OF MEDICATIONS 
The pre-positioning approach is currently in practice in several LHDs and has 
helped them to meet the challenges of procuring resources during an emergency.  Having 
a local stockpile to prophylax POD staff as well as Fire, EMS and Law Enforcement 
personnel and their families could prove to be a huge advantage because personnel 
required for mass prophylaxis could be prophylaxed before the SNS arrives.  This 
indirectly helps the entire community because response staff would be ready when SNS 
arrives.  This ensures continuity of government and at the same time serves as an 
incentive for jurisdictions receiving prophylaxis to send their employees to work at PODs 
(Public Health Training Network, 2006).  Pre-positioning will also prophylax a large 
subset of the population and keep them away from PODs.  In this study we will consider 
two different types of pre-positioning practices: one for government employees, defined 
as those (including contract employees) working for local (county or city) governments 
and their families, and pre-positioning for hospital patients, staff and families of staff 
members.  The number of bottles received by staff for their family members would be 
determined by the median family size in the jurisdiction.   
Prophylactic drugs can be purchased using funding from the Urban Area Security 
Initiative (UASI) or Metropolitan Medical Response System (MMRS) to stockpile 
medications for first responders; funds from CDC can be used to purchase drugs for 
public health emergency response personnel; and funds from the Health Resource and 
Services Administration (HRSA) can be used for hospitals.  The first responder 
population includes Law Enforcement, Fire, EMS personnel and “all people that have 
been identified in helping in some form or another with decision making, security or 
public health response during an actual event (Public Health Training Network, 2006).” 
The most important step in setting up a pre-positioning operation is to coordinate 
plans between LHDs and other local government agencies and hospitals.  Medications 
could be stored at government offices and hospitals or they could be stored in a centrally 
located warehouse under the control of the health department.  LHDs must provide clear 
guidelines as to what the responsibilities are of each agency receiving the medications.  
The LHDs would be responsible for writing and managing grants and ensuring that the 
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drugs are rotated before they expire.  If the drugs are pre-deployed then it would be the 
responsibility of the agency accepting the drugs to maintain their cache under strict 
supervision of the LHD.  No agency would be allowed to distribute drugs without the 
consent of the Public Health Officer of the LHD.   If the drugs are located at a central 
warehouse it would be the responsibility of the LHD to maintain the cache; the partner 
agency would be responsible to pick up and dispense the drugs during an emergency.  A 
signed MOU would be required between agencies detailing the maintenance of the cache 
and the requirements and responsibilities of both agencies.  LHDs would be responsible 
for ensuring compliance with the policies of the program and would therefore need to 
create a registry for all personnel working for each partner agency.  The registry must 
include all locations of the drugs, the amount of drugs and contact information of the 
personnel responsible for dispensing at the partner agency.   
Setting up a pre-positioning system can be time-consuming, as it requires buy-in 
from many partner agencies to offer a significant advantage over PODs.  But the security 
requirement for pre-positioning is generally deemed as low, the time required to 
prophylax first responders and their families is minimal and it can significantly reduce 
bottleneck at PODs (Public Health Training Network, 2006).  The option requires no staff 
from the LHDs during an emergency if the drugs are pre-positioned on-site or very little 
staff if the drugs are located in a central warehouse.  It is essential that first responders 
including POD staff know that they and their families are being taken care of to ensure a 
successful and efficient response.  
B. DISPENSING MEDICATIONS AT BUSINESSES 
The federal government has gone to great lengths to encourage businesses to 
create a Business Continuity Plan.  Businesses can expect huge losses, as seen during the 
SARs outbreak, when a significant disease terrorizes the general population.  People may 
refuse to go to work and choose to go to PODs to pick up medications for themselves and 
their families instead.  Many LHDs see businesses as an untapped resource (Public 
Health Training Network, 2006).  If LHDs can convince large employers to prophylax 
their own employees and their families, it will keep employees at work so business can 
continue.  This is of clear benefit to the private sector, but it would also reduce the 
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pressure on PODs by reducing the number of people who need them.  It is important that 
LHDs try to target large employers and those that deal with critical infrastructure such as 
power, water and communications.  The LHD in Orange County, Florida, has had great 
success with their business PODs.  The challenge for the jurisdiction is to prophylax 1.6 
million people in Orlando within 48 hours.  After establishing MOAs with large 
employers and medical facilities to prophylax their own employees and their families, the 
department estimates that they can prophylax 40% of their population without recourse to 
their POD (Crow, 2007b).   
A business POD would require an MOU between the LHD and the private sector 
partner that will specify the roles and responsibilities of both agencies.  It would be the 
responsibility of the LHD to notify business partners about the activation of the 
dispensing plan, separate and repackage medication that will be allotted to each business, 
create and send forms, as well as notify a responsible party regarding the location (the 
distribution site) and pick up time for the prophylactic medications.  The health 
department would also be responsible to train key personnel to provide just-in-time 
training to the business POD staff.  Businesses would be responsible for picking up and 
dispensing drugs to their employees with proper medical oversight, distributing forms 
and information sheets to their employees, setting up and staffing a business POD and 
returning all unused items along with completed patient forms back to the department of 
health (Crow, 2007b).  After an MOU is signed, the LHD would issue an authorization 
letter to the businesses, and the person responsible to pick up the medications would have 
to bring this letter along with photo identification in order to gain access to the 
distribution site.  
Once the decision to activate the Business POD dispensing plan is made, the LHD 
will notify their point of contact at each business and ask them for the total number of 
employees on their payroll and give the time and location for pick up of their 
medications.  A distribution site would be set up to distribute drugs to businesses.  The 
company point of contact would either arrive at the site or send a representative with the 
letter of authorization to pick up the medications.  This representative would be 
responsible for taking the medications back to their business POD.  Medications would 
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be dispensed to all employees who would also receive prophylactic drugs for their 
families. Large businesses typically have occupational health nurses on staff to oversee 
issues such as workers compensation and therefore provide medical oversight; they may 
in some cases choose to contract their employee health services from an outside agency 
such as an industrial health clinic or a medical consultant firm to come in during an 
emergency and provide for medical oversight of dispensing.  Nevertheless, businesses 
may be unable to locate medical staff to provide proper dispensing oversight.  In such a 
case, businesses would ask employees if they have any relative who has a medical license 
– such as a nurse, doctor, pharmacist or dentist – and would be willing to take 
responsibility of medical oversight during dispensing.  In the worst case scenario, the 
LHD would provide medical staff for medical oversight.  However, the goal of this 
alternate mode of dispensing is for the LHD NOT to deploy any medical personnel.   
Efficient business continuity is essential to preventing heavy economical losses 
during a disaster (Linder, 2004).  Incorporating business PODs in mass prophylaxis 
planning would be a giant leap forward to strengthen recovery efforts for all parties.  
Employees would return to work faster and LHDs can reduce pressure on PODs and their 
staffing/security resources. 
C. DISPENSING TO SHELTERED IN POPULATIONS 
The Sheltered-in Populations (SIPs) are typically defined as the populations that 
cannot make it to a POD at all, or only with great difficulty.  If they do go to the PODs 
with great hardship, they may be unable to stand in long lines for an extended period of 
time and could slow throughput. SIPs are particularly vulnerable as they require special 
care from staff at the facilities where they are located.  As seen during Katrina, the 
sheltered-in population residing in nursing homes, group homes and assisted living 
facilities can easily be victimized when staff abandons their facilities to care for 
themselves and their families (Public Health Training Network, 2006).   
A very successful SIPs plan was developed in Oklahoma by the Oklahoma 
City/County Health Department.  The plan targeted jails, nursing homes, group homes, 
residential care, hospice, and home health care facilities, required minimum staffing and 
security and could still serve a significant portion of this population. The program also 
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developed relationships with meals-on-wheels programs to distribute medications.  
Although most of these facilities are required by law to have medically licensed staff on 
hand, there are some that do not.  In the latter case the health department looked to family 
members of the resident or a family friend that had a medical license and was willing to 
take responsibility for the given facility and in every case found a representative (Public 
Health Training Network, 2006).    
The biggest challenge that Oklahoma City encountered in setting up its SIPs 
dispensing plan was the creation of a registry, because finding their target agencies was 
very challenging.  The Oklahoma City/County Health Department worked closely with 
state agencies that were involved in licensing, other agencies that deal with the target 
population, and even resorted to using the phone book.  The registry included all 
locations of the target population, the number of people living there and the number of 
staff working there along with the members of their immediate household.  They also 
identified a single primary and two secondary points of contact during an emergency to 
be notified of the location of the SIP site.  These contacts were required to be a licensed 
medical professional (Public Health Training Network, 2006). The LHD would issue an 
authorization letter to each participating agency after an MOU had been signed.  The 
primary points of contact would be called during an emergency and notified about the 
location and time where they could pick up their medications.  The primary point of 
contact or a designee would bring the authorization letter and a photo identification to 
pick up the drugs for the facility.  The designee would be given the drugs and forms to be 
filled out for each patient and returned to the LHD. It would be the responsibility of this 
representative to dispense the drugs to the resident population at their facility (Public 
Health Training Network, 2006).  
There have been several challenges that Oklahoma City/County Health 
Department had to overcome during the initial phases.  The most important had to do 
with engagement of the higher level personnel at each agency, who were reluctant at first 




drugs needed during an emergency.  A secondary problem down the road was keeping 
the registry updated, due to a high turn-over rate at the targeted facilities (Public Health 
Training Network, 2006). 
Today the SIPs plan has been tested in Oklahoma and has been very successful.  
There were 150 facilities in their registry providing prophylaxis to 250,000 people in 
Oklahoma County in 2006.  During an exercise 50,000 doses were given out in three 
hours using only nine dispensing staff members and minimal security.  The success of the 
SIPs plan has been so great that Oklahoma City/County Health Department is planning to 
expand the program in phases to include more groups (Public Health Training Network, 
2006). 
D. DISPENSING TO STUDENTS AT COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES 
There are approximately 16 million students attending colleges and universities in 
the United States today (University of Colorado, 2007).  Several major metropolitan areas 
such as Boston, New York and Los Angeles have a large number of colleges and 
universities with a large student body.  College and university health centers in the 
United States provide low-cost primary health care to 80% of students nationwide 
(Patrick, 1988).  There are no federal requirements for universities or colleges to have a 
health center on campus but most do (Patrick, 1988). 
Student health centers at colleges and universities are usually staffed by Nurse 
Practitioners, Registered Nurses or Physicians Assistants.  Some universities have 
medical doctors on staff while smaller institutions maintain a part-time relationship with 
local doctors to staff the health center during certain hours.  Research universities may 
also have faculty that are medically licensed to dispense medication and thus can provide 
oversight for the dispensing process (Education Encyclopedia, 2002).  Colleges and 
universities have the infrastructure (large open space for dispensing such as auditoriums 
or basketball courts), medical staff, and non-clinical staff in the form of teachers as well 
as the student body required to run a POD. 
The university/college POD would be a closed POD for students, staff and faculty 
with valid institution identification.  LHDs must ensure that a university or college has a 
proper location to set up the POD and conduct a security assessment to make sure that the 
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area can be secured by university police or the local law enforcement agency.  LHDs 
must also verify the clinical and non-clinical work force available to run a 
university/college POD and the number of students attending the institution.  Universities 
with an extremely large student body may require additional clinical staff from the LHDs 
to prophylax within the forty-eight-hour timeframe.  A mandatory MOU between the 
college or university and LHD would articulate the roles and responsibilities of each.  
Following the activation of the plan, it would be the responsibility of the LHD to notify 
the colleges and universities and obtain essential information regarding student and 
faculty numbers.  Since some large universities with multiple campuses have a 
transportation system, they would therefore have the drivers and resources to pick up 
medication from a designated location and deliver them.  Those without transportation 
assets could request resources from campus police or the LHD.  It would be the 
responsibility of the university to set up, staff and operate a POD with guidance available 
from the LHD.  It would be the responsibility of the university/college to return all filled 
out forms and unused assets to the health department.  Since some colleges and 
universities are state-run, LHDs must consult their state board of education as well as the 
university management during early stages of planning.   
There is debate whether to allow students to pick up medication for their families, 
since university staff and faculty would be allowed to do so.  The main argument against 
this is that college students may be from out of town or living in student housing – in 
other words, away from their families.  However, at community colleges students are 
typically local and reside near their families.  This issue must be resolved by each 
jurisdiction at early stages of planning.   
Colleges and universities are capable of providing the infrastructure to support 
mass prophylaxis that includes site, staff and in some cases security.  Prophylaxing 
students, faculty and their families will significantly reduce the pressure on PODs, and 
LHDs may also be able to recruit students as volunteer staff members. 
E. DISPENSING TO RESIDENTS AT MAJOR HOTEL CHAINS 
Most major metropolitan areas such as Los Angeles, Las Vegas, and New York 
not only have large local populations but must also deal with a fluctuating population of 
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tourist and business travelers.  It may be extremely difficult for this population to locate 
PODs as they may not be familiar with the surroundings.  However, LHDs must still 
prophylax this surplus population within forty-eight hours. 
The Southern Nevada Health District (SNHD), which includes Las Vegas, 
adopted a unique solution to deal with its fluctuating population as Las Vegas has over 
300,000 tourists on peak days (Public Health Training Network, 2006).  The SNHD 
partnered with hotel and resort chains to set up closed PODs to prophylax employees and 
their families as well as all guests.  This partnership was successful as it lowered 
economic loss for the hotels and resorts and at the same time prophylaxed the fluctuating 
and local population.   
To make such a plan operational an MOU between the LHD and the hotel and 
resort chains would be required.  It would be the responsibility of the LHD to provide the 
hotel chains with proper forms, medications, and training to key personnel involved in 
the dispensing process.  It would the responsibility of the hotel and resort chains to set up 
and run the POD and provide all medical and non-medical staff required for dispensing; 
they would also have to demonstrate the availability of space and staff before the MOU 
could be signed. Hotel and resort chains often have an occupational nurse on staff for 
issues such as workers comp or may choose to contract with an industrial health clinic or 
a medical consultant firm.  It would be the responsibility of the hotel and resort chains to 
return all patient forms and unused medications to the LHD.   
F. DISPENSING THROUGH KAISER PERMANENTE 
Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs) are a type of a managed care 
organization that provides health insurance in the United States.  In the United States 
today 85% of the population has some form of health insurance (US Census Bureau, 
2005).  During a medical emergency most individuals turn to their health care provider or 
primary physician (typically associated with an HMO).  Many leading HMOs conduct flu 
vaccine clinics for their members and therefore have some form of experience dealing 
with mass prophylaxis. 
In the Denver Metro Area a unique relationship has developed between the LHD 
and Kaiser Permanente, the largest health care provider in the area.  Kaiser Permanente 
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typically conducts a drive-thru flu clinic in the area and therefore has experience in mass 
prophylaxis.  Kaiser Permanente also has the clinical and non clinical staff to support 
mass prophylaxis as well as the location and partnerships to set up a drive-thru POD.  
The MOU between the LHD and Kaiser Permanente states that it would be the 
responsibility of the LHD to provide Kaiser Permanente with prophylactic medications 
and forms.  It would be the responsibility of Kaiser Permanente to dispense medications 
to their members and employees (and families of employees) only and return all unused 
medications and completed forms back to the LHD.   
Although Kaiser Permanente typically conducts a drive thru POD using its own 
staff, this should not be a requirement.  HMOs should be given the freedom to determine 
their own form of dispensing, either setting up their own traditional POD, dispensing 
through their own pharmacy or setting up a drive thru POD.  It is generally not 
recommended that HMOs dispense medications through their hospitals.  In fact, this 
should be strongly discouraged and HMOs should be required to create dispensing sites 
away from their hospitals.  All prophylaxis plans would be required to be evaluated by 
the LHD prior to the event.  Delivery options would need to be worked out as HMOs 
typically have their own logistics planning section and could therefore provide trucks and 
drivers.  This is recommended in cases where multiple PODs would be set up by HMOs. 
People are typically familiar with their HMO and turn to them for medical 
assistance.  HMOs have large medical resources and can provide non medical staff as 
well.  They generally have a strong bond with their members and have their medical 
records on file.  In some cases, such as Kaiser Permanente, they are also a large employer 
in the area.  Using HMOs to prophylax their members and their employees as well as 
their families can significantly reduce the burden on PODs.  In the case of the Denver 
Metro Area, the health department anticipates having to prophylax over 450,000 people 
outside of PODs using Kaiser Permanente.   
G. DOOR TO DOOR DISPENSING 
The MOU between DHHS and USPS, in 2004, states that the USPS would 
suspend mail delivery during an emergency and bring medicine directly to homes, known 
as the postal plan (CDC, 2000).  This option would only be available to areas designated 
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as Cities Readiness Initiative (CRI) areas based on population and geographic location 
(CDC, 2007).  As of 2006 there are seventy two CRI areas in the United States (CRI 
Workshop, 2007). 
The MOU holds USPS responsible for providing vehicles not immediately 
required for mail delivery to transport resources, report transportation disruption and 
damage information, provide staff for distribution and assist in the distribution of 
pharmaceuticals and information pamphlets as needed (USPS, 2004).  The postal plan is 
subject to availability of resources and funding and is entirely voluntary on part of the 
USPS (Public Health Training Network, 2006).  Postal employees would provide each 
household with a single bottle of doxycycline to provide the community with the first 
dose and prevent initial surge at PODs, giving LHDs the time to gather resources.  The 
USPS has the capability to deliver pharmaceuticals door to door due to its nationwide 
presence and a vast logistical infrastructure.   
On November 11, 2006, postal employees delivered empty cardboard boxes and 
information flyers to residents in certain Seattle neighborhoods.  During the nine-hour 
exercise, forty one postal employees accompanied by armed police officers delivered 
medications to 38,000 households. Based on the average household size in Seattle, 2.05, 
the LHD could have initially kept 77,900 people away from PODs (15% of the 
population) away from PODs.  These numbers could increase several fold if the number 
of postal employees performing the delivery is increased.   
Door-to-door delivery can still be accomplished in non-CRI cities as seen in the 
case of Chesapeake, Virginia.  This LHD accomplished the task of prophylaxing its 
population of 218,000 utilizing help from the school districts.  Using school buses, bus 
drivers, escort vehicles and eight medical personnel, the LHD dispensed medication to 
1,100 individuals in less than two hours.  The receipt was confirmed by a phone call into 
an automated system that kept track of the delivery via GIS.  The planners in Chesapeake 
Health Department now plan to prophylax their entire population using 200 school buses 
and with help from local Community Emergency Response Teams (CERTs) and the 
Medical Reserve Corps (MRC) (Linder, 2004). 
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Similarly, LHDs could choose to contract with UPS, FedEx or DHL to provide 
door-to-door delivery.  All major delivery service providers have a logistic infrastructure 
that includes personnel, GIS tracking, and route planning software.  However, security 
issues would need to be considered and LHDs could try to use private armed security 
services in case law enforcement availability is low.   
H. DRIVE-THRU DISPENSING 
Drive-thru prophylaxis originally gained popularity as a mechanism to deliver 
influenza prophylaxis to the elderly.  A review of the program in the post-9/11 era 
determined that the program could be used to provide PPE and prophylaxis to the 
population while maintaining some form of isolation.  The drive-thru PODs have a 
simple set up: patients drive to the site and while in their car, receive informed consent, 
have a brief history taken (to prevent contraindications) and then receive immunization 
while still in their car (CDC, 2007).  Drive-thru dispensing seems to be a very popular 
alternate mode of dispensing and has been exercised and adopted by several LHDs.  The 
Orlando LHD’s plan has a throughput of 761 people per hour using thirteen medical and 
fifty seven non-medical staff (total of seventy) per shift (Pate, 2007).  These staffing 
requirements are much lower than staff recommended at a POD run in the Orlando area 
according to the Berm staffing model.  Using their drive-thru plan they anticipate 
prophylaxing 60% of their population. 
A drive-thru POD should be located close to major roads, highways or freeways 
in order to prevent traffic jams.  It is highly recommended that the ingress and egress 
points be large enough to allow multiple lanes of traffic. Similarly, the location should be 
large enough to accommodate multiple lanes for dispensing (Linder, 2004).  The Orlando 
plan calls for ten lanes of dispensing to ensure a high throughput and to prevent overflow 
of traffic onto neighboring streets (Pate, 2007).  Traffic control and security plans would 
have to be excellent to prevent an overflow of traffic onto adjacent freeways, highways or 
streets and to prevent road rage that could severely disrupt the process. It is generally not 
recommended that a drive-thru POD have more than three stops in order to keep the 
traffic flowing freely.  The first stop would be for a quick triage and form completion; the 
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drivers would then be separated based on contraindications into a separate line and the 
rest would go though common lines.  The final stop would be to pick up the  medications.   
A big advantage of drive-thru PODs is that their feasibility has been tested by the 
flu vaccination clinics each year.  Space requirements are much more dynamic and are 
not bound by the strict constraints that traditional PODs are held to.  In terms of security, 
law enforcement agencies have stated that they find it much easier to control traffic at a 
drive-thru POD than at a traditional POD.  Another advantage to using drive-thru PODs 
is that the environment within the car can be climate controlled, hence protecting the 
population from extreme heat or cold.  
There are also some disadvantages to using a drive-thru POD. POD staff are 
exposed to the weather conditions.  Drive-thru POD would be limited to daytime 
operations.  This is because not all park and recreation sites have outdoor lighting.  LHDs 
must plan to remove from the line cars that break down or run out of gas.  At the same 
time lines will still be long and it would be much more difficult for people to use 
facilities. There is a potentially increased risk of careless or panicked drivers, road rage, 
and carbon monoxide/dioxide build up. 
I. DISPENSING THRU PHARMACIES 
Private sector pharmacies could also be a potential partner for health departments 
during a public health emergency requiring mass prophylaxis.  Pharmacies located at 
retail stores, wholesale markets, and chain pharmacies can accomplish a part of mass 
prophylaxis. The public is typically familiar with their local store, and the public knows 
and trusts them, a factor that will be critical to the success of a mass distribution effort.  
There is a retail pharmacy within five miles of 95% of the U.S. Population (CDC, 2002; 
Dufour, 2005).  Every year, large retail stores with pharmacies and private pharmacy 
chains conduct influenza vaccination clinics at their facilities.  Some of these conduct 
their campaign internally, whereas others contract with private community-based health 
service providers to organize their campaign (Singleton, 2005).  Twenty-five to thirty 
million doses, accounting for one-third of the nation’s flu vaccine, were administered by 
retail store/wholesale store pharmacies and private chain pharmacies (Lien, 2006).   
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A large number of pharmacies are located in large retail stores or strip malls, and 
have ample outdoor parking as well as the indoor space to accommodate a large number 
of people and maintain their normal operations.  Pharmacies have electronic inventory 
systems and can receive and manage SNS inventory, a secure location to store drugs, 
medical staff to meet federal and state dispensing requirements and non-medical staff that 
can serve essential functions during the dispensing process.  Above all many private retail 
companies would be willing to work closely with the LHDs during mass prophylaxis. In 
a study conducted by Dr. Onora Lien, she interviewed executives from various grocery 
store retail pharmacies and pharmacies located within chain wholesale clubs and they 
were almost undivided in their endorsement and interest in planning for and responding 
to a public health emergency (Lien, 2006).  Representatives from these agencies noted 
that although they were a “For-Profit” business there was a “strong connection between 
assisting during an emergency and maintaining or improving their reputation within the 
community.” (Lien, 2006)   
Due to a large number of pharmacies in any area, it may be impossible or in some 
cases ill- advised for LHDs to obtain MOUs for all pharmacies under a brand name.  It 
would be best to consider geospatial analysis and find optimal locations such as areas 
without PODs, areas with low security concerns and areas with a moderate population 
density.  Retail store, warehouse and chain pharmacies have existing systems and 
relationships that enable them to deliver medicines in large quantities to the public and 
should therefore be considered an important partner in mass prophylaxis (CA DHS, 
2003). 
These alternate modes of dispensing provide several advantages over the 
traditional POD in terms of throughput, maximum number of people reached and staffing 
(both clinical and non-clinical).  However, all of them require the establishment of MOUs 
prior to an incident.  There will still be work associated with each of the options in during 
an incident.  Therefore, LHDs should look to determine which alternatives are the “best” 
options to supplement the traditional POD system so they can be efficient and leverage 
the scarce resources optimally.  
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IV. EVALUATING MODES OF MASS PROPHYLAXIS 
There are several alternate modes of dispensing available for mass prophylaxis 
beyond the use of PODs.  However, currently there are no studies that analyze and 
compare these alternatives.  Since the speed of dispensing (or total number reached where 
applicable), staffing requirements, and security needs for the various mode of dispensing 
are different, it is difficult to quantitatively estimate the advantages offered by one mode 
of dispensing over another. 
In situations where there are multiple competing objectives, trade-offs among the 
objectives need to be made.  For example, is saving clinical LHD staff (a scarce resource) 
more important than increasing the speed of dispensing?  The answer to this question 
depends on both the decision maker’s preferences and the degree to which the objectives 
have already been satisfied.  The development of a MAVF is one approach that supports 
multi-criteria decisions by explicitly quantifying the trade-offs a decision maker is 
willing to make between attributes.  Using this approach, a hierarchy of objectives is 
developed capturing the essence of the decision as viewed by the decision maker, the 
relative importance of the objectives is measured and alternatives are evaluated based on 
their performance on the selected objectives.  The process reveals and documents 
decision maker’s preferences.  It also highlights areas where different decision makers 
may have points of disagreement.  Finally, since the analysis is quantitative, it permits 
marginal and sensitivity analysis to be rapidly performed for a variety of scenarios.  
A MAVF offers several advantages as it considers each alternative independently, 
it provides a good approximation in practice, can be easily explained, and can be 
understood by decision makers from non-statistical backgrounds.  This process can best 
be viewed as a series of three steps.  The first step is to develop the objectives hierarchy 
which clarifies the objectives of importance, how they relate to each other, and how they 
will be measured.  The second step is to develop the individual value functions for each 
attribute which details how much of each attribute is desirable.  In addition to 
transforming disparate attribute measures into a common scale, this method examines the 
ranges of importance and the returns to scale in terms of value over this range.  The final 
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step is to develop the relative importance weights among the different objectives.  Once 
all of these steps have been completed, an overall measure of value can be calculated for 
each alternative. 
It is important to note that each of these steps reflects the subjective values of the 
decision maker.  Depending on who is queried for input, different objectives, functions, 
and weights may arise.  One of the strengths of this process is to force decision makers to 
articulate their preferences, allowing them to be discussed and analyzed.  In addition, it is 
possible to determine how much each subjective value can change before another 
alternative would be chosen. 
A. OBJECTIVE HIERARCHY 
The goal of all alternate modes of dispensing is to prophylax a large number of 
people, using fewer clinical and non-clinical staff than PODs and with fewer security 
resources for transporting drugs to the site of dispensing and securing the site itself.  All 
alternate modes of dispensing described in Chapter III fall into two categories: those that 
target the entire population within the jurisdiction of the LHD and those that target 
specific subsets of the entire population.  This major distinguishing characteristic requires 
the creation of two different models to evaluate alternate modes of dispensing.  The goal 
of each model is to determine the overall effectiveness of each alternate mode of 
dispensing.  This will enable the LA County LHD to decide which avenues it wants to 
develop now so that the requisite MOUs can be set up. 
In this chapter, Model A will represent three alternate modes of dispensing that 
target the entire population within the LHD’s jurisdiction: 1) Dispensing to the Public 
Through Pharmacies, 2) Drive-Thru Dispensing and 3) Door-to-Door Dispensing.  Model 
B will represent the eight alternate modes of dispensing that target specific subsets of the 
general population, or 1) Pre-positioning of Medications for Civil Service Staff and their 
Families, 2) Pre-positioning of Medications for Hospital Patients, Staff and Staff 
Families, 3) Dispensing Medications at Businesses, 4) Dispensing to Sheltered-in 
Population, 5) Dispensing to Students at Colleges and Universities, 6) Dispensing to 
Residents at Major Hotel Chains, 7) Dispensing through Kaiser Permanente, and 8) Door-
to-Door Dispensing.  The Door-to-Door Dispensing option will appear in both models as 
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it can be used to prophylax the entire population within the jurisdiction of the LHD or a 
specific geographic area within the jurisdiction LHD. 
1. Model A 
In Figure 2, the hierarchy of attributes that we will use for our analysis is shown 
for Model A.  The goal of our analysis for Model A is to determine the overall 
effectiveness of alternate modes of dispensing that target the entire population.  This goal 
is based on evaluation of three independent attributes: speed of dispensing, percent staff 
reduction and security.  Percent staff reduction is based on the evaluation of two 
attributes, percent reduction of clinical staff and non-clinical staff.  Security is also based 
on the evaluation of two attributes, security requirement at the site of dispensing and 
security requirements to transport the drugs to the site of dispensing. 
 
Figure 2.   Hierarchy of Attributes in Model A for Analysis of Overall Effectiveness for 
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speed of dispensing for the pharmacy option is defined as the total number of people who 
can be prophylaxed by the pharmacy dispensing option per hour at all sites.  Similarly, 
the door-to-door option is also an all-or-nothing approach.  The speed of dispensing is 
similarly defined as the total number of people who can be prophylaxed by door-to-door 
dispensing per hour by all postal workers deployed.  Finally, the speed of dispensing for 
the drive-thru option is the throughput at a single drive-thru POD, since they can be 
activated on a case-by-case basis, based on availability of staff and security.  The speed 
of dispensing for the drive-thru dispensing options will be defined as the number of 
people who can be prophylaxed by the alternate mode of dispensing per hour.  The speed 
of dispensing can be determined through exercises held by the LHDs, after action reports 
from other jurisdictions as well as the national TOPOFF 3 exercise and/or estimates of a 
work group within the LHD. 
Most LHDs have two major sources for POD staffing, their government 
employees and volunteer staff.  For example in LAC, LAC DPH could use its own 
employees, employees in other county departments, and non-essential employees 
working for city governments to staff PODs.  The volunteer POD staff for LAC could 
come from spontaneous volunteers that arrive at local mobilization centers (MC), clinical 
volunteers that have registered on the Emergency System for Advanced Registration of 
Volunteer Healthcare Professionals (ESAR-VHP) registry and volunteers who have been 
registered by Volunteer Center of Los Angeles (VCLA).  For each alternate mode of 
dispensing, the percent staff reduction is defined in comparison to the traditional POD in 
LA County.  Only the staff for a given option that comes at the expense of a POD staff is 
considered in this attribute.  For example, postal employees required for door-to-door 
dispensing do not come at the expense of POD staff as identified above and therefore 
would provide a staff reduction of 100% as compared to the traditional POD. This 
definition holds for the two sub-attribute percent clinical staff reduction and percent non-
clinical staff reduction.  The figures for these sub-attributes for each alternate mode of 
dispensing can be derived based on literature review, exercises, and/or estimates of a 
work group within the LHD.  Baseline estimates for POD staffing to compute percent 
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staff reduction can also be obtained from exercises and/or estimates of work groups as 
well as by using the BERM model for dispensing.  
Overall Security is defined via its sub-attributes – transportation security and site 
security.  Each of these is defined as a subjective assessment of the security resources that 
are required by each alternate mode of dispensing.  The figures for each sub-attribute can 
be derived using a survey that is to be administered to a committee specifically dealing 
with security of mass prophylaxis or a similar work group.  The survey should ask 
committee members to rate the security requirements on a scale of 1-10, with ten being 
the highest security requirement and one being the lowest. 
2. Model B 
In Figure 3, the hierarchy of attributes for Model B is shown.  The goal of our 
analysis for Model B is to determine the overall effectiveness of alternate modes of 
dispensing that targets a defined subset of the entire population.  This goal is based on 
evaluation of three independent attributes, maximum number reached, percent staff 
reduction and security.  Percent staff reduction and security are also based on the 
evaluation of two sub-attributes as seen in Model A. 
 
 
Figure 3.   Hierarchy of Attributes in Model B for Analysis of Overall Effectiveness for 
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Unlike Model A, where speed of dispensing is an important characteristic, in 
Model B the maximum number reached is an important attribute since only a subset of 
the population is being targeted.  Maximum number reached is defined as the highest 
number of people who can be prophylaxed using a given option.  This figure is heavily 
dependent on how each LHD chooses to define the targeted population and requires 
thorough literature review to obtain estimates for the target population. 
Percent staff reduction and its sub-attributes are defined as in Model A.  The 
estimates for staff requirement for alternate mode of dispensing for a twelve-hour shift 
are cumulative of all sites where the alternate mode of dispensing is to be implemented.  
Unlike PODs that can be activated on a case-by-case basis based on availability 
resources, an alternate mode of dispensing can only be completely activated.  The 
staffing estimates in Model B are heavily dependent on how an LHD defines the 
operation of an alternate mode of dispensing. 
Security and its two sub-attributes are defined as in Model A. 
B. INDIVIDUAL VALUE FUNCTION 
In model A, percent staff reduction is defined as a percentage, speed of dispensing 
is defined as people per hour and security is measured on a scale of one to ten.  In Model 
B, speed of dispensing is replaced by the maximum number that can be reached and the 
unit of measure is people.  Therefore the units of all of the attributes in the two models 
are unique.  This difference in units makes direct cross comparison of attributes (and 
alternatives) impossible.   
An individual value function is “a relationship that transforms a measurement 
over a range of relevant values and converts it into a common unit of values, defined 
between 0 and 1 (Richter, 2007).”  Once this relationship is established for each attribute, 
all the attributes will be measured in common units permitting them to be directly 
combined.  In order to develop individual value functions we must first ascertain 
individual measurable values for each attribute for each alternate mode of dispensing.  
Since we have listed the units of measure, this has been done.  Once these values have 
been ascertained it is necessary to evaluate if the scale used to evaluate efficiency of each 
attribute is increasing or decreasing.  The scale as it relates to the speed of dispensing in 
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Model A and the maximum number reached in Model B is increasing, because the 
efficiency of the attribute depends on increasing throughput in the former and reaching 
more people in the latter.  The scale for percent reduction in staff and overall security is 
decreasing in both models because the former attribute is more effective if fewer staff are 
required and the latter is more effective if the overall security requirement is low. 
The second step to develop individual value functions requires users to set bounds 
for each attribute based on the decision maker’s preference.  These bounds are basically 
endpoints that define the minimum and maximum useful performance of an alternate 
mode of dispensing for each attribute.  The lower bound (minimum useful performance) 
is a value below which there is no appreciable value for an attribute.  In other words, all 
alternatives whose attribute measure is below the minimum bound are equally 
undesirable.  Similarly, the upper bound (maximum useful performance) is a value above 
which there is no appreciable value for an attribute.  In other words, all alternatives 
whose attribute measure is above the maximum bound are equally desirable. 
Finally, using the formula (1) 
 
v(attribute) = Individual Measurable Value – Lower Bound  (1) 
Upper Bound – Lower Bound  
 
individual value functions for each attribute are determined.  If the individual value 
function is a negative number, i.e. the individual measurable value is lower than the 
lower bound; the individual value function is assigned the value zero.  Similarly, if the 
individual value function is greater than one, i.e. the individual measurable value is 
greater than the upper bound; the individual value function is assigned the value of one.  
All individual measurable values that fall between the upper and lower bound are 
translated to a value between zero and one.  For each attribute, the function is applied to 
every alternative mode of dispensing. 
C. RELATIVE IMPORTANCE 
The final step required to calculate MAVF is setting weights for each attribute.  
Weights are based on the preference of the decision maker and thus represent the trade-
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offs a decision maker is willing to make between attributes (Richter, 2007).  Weights are 
typically the subjective opinion of experts, objective results of models or data analysis, or 
a combination of both (Richter, 2007).  The weights at the highest level in the object 
hierarchy must add up to a value of one and the sum of weights of the sub attributes 
under each attribute must add up to one. 
In order to analyze alternate modes of dispensing subject matter experts dealing 
with SNS, CRI and mass prophylaxis were administered a survey to assess the trade-off 
they were willing to make between the three attributes and the sub-attributes.  The 
concept of alternate modes of dispensing is not new to the subject matter experts; 
however, their knowledge of MAVF is limited.  The survey asks subject matter experts to 
divide twenty  poker chips among the three top-level attributes based on the relative 
importance of each attribute (according to their professional opinion).  They are also 
asked  how they would divide twenty poker chips between the two sub-attributes under 
the attribute percent staff reduction and divide twenty poker chips for the two sub-
attributes under the attribute overall security.  This survey is administered twice, once for 
model A and once for model B.  Weight values can be obtained by dividing the number 
of poker chips assigned to each attribute and sub-attribute by twenty (the total number of 
poker chips).  The final weight values to be used for analysis are the average weight for 
each attribute and sub-attribute from the committee.  The high and low values will inform 
the sensitivity analyses. 
D. RESULTS AND SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
Once objectives hierarchy have been established, individual value functions have 
been obtained for each attribute and the weights for each attribute have been determined, 
we can calculate the overall value of each alternate mode of dispensing.  The overall 
effectiveness for each alternate mode of dispensing can be obtained using formula (2) 
 
Overall Effectiveness = Sum of (value of Attribute Y * weight of Attribute Y)  (2) 
 
The product of the value of attribute Y and weight of attribute Y is the 
effectiveness of the attribute at a given weight for a given criteria.  This analysis is 
 45
performed for both models and is graphically represented using Microsoft Excel’s 
stacked column bar graph function.  The graphical illustration shows the overall 
effectiveness of all alternate mode of dispensing compared to each other and shows the 
categorical effectiveness of each attribute across all alternate modes of dispensing.  This 
will serve as the base case analysis. 
The final weights and overall security are assessed by administering a survey to a 
committee comprised of subject matter experts. This committee was comprised of public 
health, EMS, fire department and law enforcement personnel among others.  An 
important sensitivity analysis is to run the MAVF again using inputs of only law 
enforcement personnel on overall security and weights and compare it to the baseline 
measures.  Doing so will give the LHD a better idea as to how different their perspective 
on the matter is from law enforcement agencies.   
It is essential to examine whether changing the weights in a one-way sensitivity 
analysis would result in different choices.  One-way sensitivity analysis determines how 
susceptible to change the overall effectiveness is when one parameter is varied at a time.  
A two-way sensitivity analysis is also performed varying two weights simultaneously.  
Given the constraint that the weights must sum to one, this implies that the third weight 
varies as well.  Finally an analysis of underlying assumptions is conducted. Break point 
analyses are performed to understand how the changes in the assumptions of the speed of 
dispensing either at the POD level, the number of postal carriers, or the number of 



















V. THE CASE OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY 
A. OVERVIEW OF THE COUNTY 
LAC is extremely large and requires additional measures to ensure that the entire 
county can be prophylaxed within 48 hours.  Traditional PODs will not be sufficient as 
there is simply not enough staff to open all the PODs necessary to accommodate the 
population.  To complicate matters, the County has several high priority targets, is a large 
tourist destination, neighbors a larger tourist destination, has daytime population influx, 
and a large sheltered in population.  The models will help guide the investment in 
alternate modes of dispensing to best accomplish the prophylactic goals. 
1. Location and Jurisdiction 
The LAC located in southern California, spans across 4,752 square miles and 
includes flat lands, hills, mountains, valleys, lakes, rivers, marshes and islands as well as 
fifty miles of coastland besides the island shores (Los Angeles County Department of 
Public Health, 2006a).  There are 2,640 square miles of unincorporated areas, which 
accounts for 65% of the county’s total land area and houses 10% of the county’s total 
population (Los Angeles County Unincorporated Areas, 2007).  The other 35% of land is 
broken down into eighty eight incorporated cities that house the remaining population 
(Los Angeles County Unincorporated Areas, 2007). The cities vary greatly in size, with 
the city of Los Angeles encompassing 485 square miles followed by Palmdale at 105 
square miles and, on the other hand, the smallest city of Hawaiian Gardens encompassing 
only .98 square miles (Los Angeles County Department of Public Health, 2006b).  The 
LAC is divided into five Supervisoral Districts, each of which has an elected 
representative on the Board of Supervisors (Los Angeles County Operational Area, 
2006).  There are three Public Health jurisdictions in the County, one representing the 
entire county, one representing the City of Pasadena and one representing the City of 
Long Beach (Los Angeles County Department of Public Health, 2006).  There are 45 
local law enforcement agencies, eight Disaster Management Areas (DMAs), eight Public 
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Health Service Planning Areas (SPAs) (Los Angeles County Department of Public 
Health, 2006a).  The county neighbors four other counties, three of whom have small 
populations.  The fourth county, also the southern neighbor of the County is Orange 
County, the fifth most populous county in the United States, with a population of over 
three million.  The geographic location of the County creates unique issues with delivery 
and since the area is so large with several freeway overpasses, tunnels and bridges, any 
damage to the transportation infrastructure could have a major negative impact on mass 
prophylaxis. 
 







California is the most populous state in the union; 29% of its population resides in 
the LAC and as of 2004, the county’s population was larger than that of forty three states.  
Based on the 2005 census estimates, the LAC has a population of 9,935,4751 
accompanied by a growth rate of 1.8% per year (United States Census Bureau, 2007).  As 
of 2005, it is estimated that slightly over 8.8 million people of the total population live in 
the eighty eight incorporated cities and another over one million people live in the 
county’s 112 unincorporated areas.  The population density within the county is very 
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high: listed at 2,345 residents per square mile, but this varies greatly by city (Los Angeles 
County Department of Public Health, 2006b).  The City of Los Angeles, for example, has 
the largest population in the county, a total population of 3.7 million people, followed by 
Long Beach with 461,000 people (United States Census Bureau, 2007). The city of 
Vernon, on the other hand, has a population of 95, the smallest population in the county 
(United States Census Bureau, 2007).  The population of the county is extremely diverse 
due to a high rate of immigration, with people representing more than a 140 nations and 
speaking over 100 languages (Los Angeles County Department of Public Health, 2007b).  
Over four million people in the county identify themselves as Latino or Hispanic, of 
whom 71% are of Mexican origin (United States Census Bureau, 2007).  Over one 
million people identify themselves as Asians, of whom 26% are of Chinese origin and 
23% Korean (United States Census Bureau, 2007).  About 1.8 million people (about 20% 
of the population) in the county are reported to have some disability (United States 
Census Bureau, 2007).  There are 3.3 million households within the county; the average 
household size is 3.06 and average family size is 3.78 (United States Census Bureau, 
2007).  LAC has the nation’s highest population living below the poverty level (45%), 
which, compounded by one of the nation’s most expensive real estate markets, produces 
the nation’s highest homeless population (Los Angeles County Department of Public 
Health, 2006b).  Homelessness continues to rise in the county with estimates of 254,000 
homeless during some time of the year and 82,000 homeless on any given night (Los 
Angeles County Department of Public Health, 2006b).  According to the Bureau of 
Citizenship and Immigration Services, most of California’s 2.5 million undocumented 
immigrants reside in the county (Los Angeles County Department of Public Health, 
2006b).  According to the Los Angeles Convention and Visitors Bureau, 5,800,000 
international tourists visited Los Angeles in 2000 and during peak seasons LAC can 
easily have over one million tourists (Los Angeles County Department of Public Health, 
2006b).  The county is separated by an invisible border from its neighboring counties and 




would need to plan to provide twelve million people with prophylaxis within forty eight 
hours of a biological attack as outlined by the CDC (Los Angeles County Department of 
Public Health, 2006b). 
B. MODEL OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY 
Recall from Chapter IV that the security rating for each option and weights for 
each attribute and sub-attribute were obtained using a survey.  In LAC weights and 
security assessments both were obtained using surveys administered to a committee of 
stakeholders in the SNS and mass prophylaxis processes.  This section will provide an 
overview about how this survey was implemented in LAC, as well as the results of this 
survey comparing the average security rating and average weights, and the rationale 
implemented in this paper to set the upper and lower bounds. 
1. The Force Protection Committee and Security Assessment 
The LAC Force Protection Committee (FPC) was established in 2002 to discuss 
and provide expert advice on all issues concerning the SNS and PODs.  The committee is 
made up of representatives from local, state and federal levels of the government and 
represents disciplines of Public Health, EMS, Law Enforcement, Fire Department and the 
Military.  The committee is chaired by the Disaster Services Analyst of the SNS Unit and 
has over fifty members.  The committee was convened in 2005 to provide expert input for 
security analysis on PODs.  The security analysis included discussions on threat analysis, 
risk assessment and the minimum security requirements to be established at the RSS 
Warehouse and the PODs during an event requiring mass prophylaxis.   
This committee has performed extensive work dealing with SNS and Mass 
Prophylaxis Planning in LAC and the members of this committee are familiar with the 
security, staffing and logistic environment in LAC.  For this reason, they were asked to 
assess the security needs for each mode of dispensing.  Two types of security were 
considered: 1) security requirements for the transportation of supplies to the site(s) and 2) 




Security needs were rated on a scale of one to ten with one being low security 
requirements and ten being very high security requirements.  Please see Appendix 1 to 
view the surveys. 
The survey was administered to the seventeen FPC members who attended the 
monthly committee meeting on February 27, 2007, and emailed along with a short 
presentation to all other members.   Of the seventeen, two members representing different 
law enforcement agencies declined to participate in the anonymous survey without 
stating any reason.  None of the members who received the survey via email responded, 
possibly because of anonymity concerns.  Of the fifteen respondents at the FPC meeting, 
three were law enforcement employees representing three different law enforcement 
agencies, eleven were public health employees representing LAC DPH and Orange 
County Health Care Agency (OC HCA) and one was an EMS employee.   
The average overall security score for each mode of dispensing can be seen in 
Table 1.  The security rating range for transportation and site is fairly wide for most 
alternate modes of dispensing.  The table also shows the average security rating for 
transportation and site security.  This rating is then compared to the average overall law 
enforcement and the difference is stated in the last two columns.  For site security the 
difference between the average overall security and average law enforcement security 
ratings is within one unit for all modes of dispensing except for dispensing to the general 
public using pharmacies where the difference is 2.5 units.  This shows that the site 
security rating between law enforcement and the entire committee is similar.  When 
considering transportation security the average security rating and the average law 
enforcement security rating is greater than one unit for dispensing to the general public 
using pharmacies (difference of 2.5) and Pre-positioning of Medications for Hospital 
Patients, Staff and Families of the Staff (difference of 1.8).   
The average security rating for two of the three options considered in Model A 
(dispensing to the general public) was lower than that of the traditional POD under 
transportation security.  All three options had a lower security requirement than a 
traditional POD when site security was compared among the options.  However, 
according to the average law enforcement rating, dispensing to the general population 
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using pharmacies was rated lowest compared to the traditional POD for site and 
transportation security.  Six of the seven alternate modes of dispensing under Model B 
had an average security rating lower than that of the traditional POD for site and 
transportation security.  The only option that had a higher security rating was the Door-
to-Door dispensing option. 
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2. Developing Individual Value Functions 
Recall from Chapter IV that in this analysis linear approximation has been used 
and therefore there is only a need to determine the minimum and maximum values for 
each criterion.  All values that are equal to or above the maximum value are evaluated as 
one, whereas all values that are equal to or below the minimum value are evaluated as 
zero.  All values in between the minimum and the maximum are interpolated via a 
straight line.   
3. Setting Maximum and Minimum for Model A 
Speed is critical in dispensing and therefore an option that provides a speed 
slower than that of a traditional POD does not provide any added benefit and therefore 
the lower bound would be set at the speed of prophylaxis as defined at a traditional POD.  
The upper bound would be set at a point ten times faster than the traditional POD. 
During an event, it may be more difficult to arrange for clinical staff than non-
clinical staff.  Therefore the maximum and minimum bounds for the two staffing 
subcategories may not be the same.  Since there is a large shortage of clinical staff every 
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individual who can be spared is critical. It will always be best to have an option that 
reduces clinical staffing by 100%, making this the upper bound.  Any option that requires 
more or the same amount of clinical staff as required by the traditional POD does not 
provide any added benefit and would therefore serve as the lower bound.  Considering 
the government of LAC is the largest employer in the county it may be easier to obtain 
non-clinical staff.  While a reduction of non-clinical staff would be considered 
advantageous, the incremental benefit of additional staff reductions is decreasing.  Any 
option that provides greater than a 75% non-clinical staff reduction may not provide an 
added benefit to the staffing category.   Therefore, this becomes the upper bound.  On the 
other hand, any option that does not reduce the non-clinical staffing by at least 25% does 
not have much impact on the staffing.  Therefore, 25% can be considered the lower 
bound. 
Since security is a strong component of an efficient mass prophylaxis strategy, 
and since security will be a critical resource, the lower the security requirement the better 
the option.  Any option that requires more security than the POD option does not 
provided any added benefit.  Therefore, we use the POD security average as obtained 
from the FPC as the lower bound.  The upper bound would be the lowest possible 
security rating on the rating scale, i.e. a one.  All minima and maxima for Model A are 
summarized in Table 2. 
 
Table 2.   Upper and Lower Bounds for Model A. 
 
  MINIMUM MAXIMUM 
Speed of Dispensing Speed at POD 10 X Speed at POD 
% Clinical Staff Reduction 0% 100% 
% Support Staff Reduction 25% 75% 
Transportation Security 6.4 1 




4. Setting Maximum and Minimum for Model B 
Considering that LAC must plan to provide prophylaxis to twelve million people 
within forty eight hours, planners must consider the amount of stress reduced on PODs as 
a measure to set the maximum and minimum bounds.  The lower bound would be set at 
the mark equal to the number of people who can be reached by a POD in forty eight 
hours.  The upper bound would be set at the mark five times faster than that. 
The staffing and security bounds would be the same as the bounds in Model A. 
All minima and maxima for Model B are summarized in Table 3. 
 
Table 3.   Upper and Lower Bounds for Model B. 
 
  MINIMUM MAXIMUM 
Maximum Number Reached 
The Number 
Prophylaxed by a POD 
in 48 hours 
5 X The Number 
Prophylaxed by a 
POD in 48 hours 
% Clinical Staff Reduction 0% 100% 
% Support Staff Reduction 25% 75% 
Transportation Security Rating 6.4 1 
Site Security Rating 7.6 1 
 
5. Setting Relative Importance 
It is important to assess the trade-offs that stakeholders in LAC are willing to 
make between attributes.  In our case the LAC FPC members were asked to complete a 
survey to assess their priorities based on their professional opinion.  Committee members 
were asked to divide twenty poker chips among the three attributes (See Appendix 2) and 
twenty poker chips among the sub-attributes under each attribute based on their 
assessment of relative importance.  To obtain the weights for the analysis, the number of 
poker chips they attributed to each attribute and sub-attribute were divided by twenty.   
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The range of weights for both models was wide.  The sub-attributes’ percent of 
clinical staff reduction received a much higher weight as compared to percent of non-
clinical staff reduction for both models.  The sub-attribute site security rating received a 
much higher rating as compared to the transportation security rating for both models.  
The relative importance assessment of attributes between law enforcement and the entire 
community differed by greater than .02 units on most attributes and sub-attributes.  This 
difference was most significant for the security rating.  The relative importance weights 
for each attribute and sub-attribute are shown in Table 4 below. 
 
Table 4.   Average and Range of Weights. 







Speed of Dispensing .2 TO .5 0.36 0.31 0.05 
% Staff Reduction .2 TO .4 0.29 0.28 0.01 
% Clinical Staff Reduction .5 TO .7 0.59 0.60 -0.01 
% Non-Clinical Staff 
Reduction 
.3 TO .5 0.41 0.40 0.01 
Security Rating .2 TO .5 0.35 0.40 -0.05 
Site Security Rating .4 TO .7 0.61 0.55 0.06 
Transportation Security 
Rating 
.3 TO .6 0.39 0.45 -0.06 
MODEL B 
Maximum Number of 
People Reached 
.3 TO .65 0.40 0.38 0.02 
% Staff Reduction .2 TO .6 0.31 0.25 0.06 
% Clinical Staff Reduction .55 TO .7 0.61 0.65 -0.04 
% Non-Clinical Staff 
Reduction 
.3 TO .45 0.39 0.35 0.04 
Security Rating .1 TO .5 0.29 0.37 -0.08 
Site Security Rating .4 TO .65 0.57 0.57 0.00 
Transportation Security 
Rating 
.35 TO.6 0.43 0.43 0.00 
 57
C. ASSESSING ATTRIBUTES FOR TRADITIONAL PODS IN LOS 
ANGELES COUNTY 
In LAC the Emergency Preparedness and Response Program was tasked to plan 
for an event requiring mass prophylaxis.  During Operation Chimera Exercise Series in 
2005, a full-scale POD exercise was conducted in Glendale, California on February 2.  
Based on the After Action Report, the rate of dispensing (the speed) was 1,500 people per 
hour at that site.  Based on the streamlined POD staffing model obtained from the Mass 
Prophylaxis Unit within the program, they estimate that a throughput of 1,500 per hour 
can be obtained using only seventy two staff members per shift.  According to the 2005 
Census Bureau estimates, the average family size in the county is 3.06, therefore the 
county can potentially prophylax 4,590 people per hour assuming heads of household are 
allowed to take medications back for household members.  Based on cross comparison of 
the throughput and staffing information obtained from the LAC DPH Emergency 
Preparedness and Response Program with the BERM Model of Dispensing, the staffing 
numbers were significantly different between the two.  Based on a population of twelve 
million, a throughput of 1,500 people per hour, using two twelve-hour shifts per day for a 
forty-eight-hour campaign, the BERM model suggests ninety eight staff per clinic per 
shift.  This difference can be attributed to the different flow models being considered.  
The LAC POD flow model is much more streamlined and does not require briefing.   
The goal of all alternate mode of dispensing is to reduce the pressure on PODs 
without dipping into critical resources like staffing and security.  The POD staffing 
requirements will serve as a baseline for percent staff reduction attribute.  This is because 
any option that has a lower staffing requirement, as compared to the POD, will be 
preferred to an option that has a higher staffing requirement.  Of the seventy two staff 
members, twelve would be clinical staff and sixty would be non-clinical staff.  Since the 
traditional POD as used in LAC serves as the baseline for our mass prophylaxis model all 













D. ASSESSING ALTERNATE MODES OF DISPENSING IN MODEL A 
Recall that in Model A, the goal is to determine which alternate mode of 
dispensing to initiate after the original corps of PODs has been opened. As demonstrated 
in Chapter IV, Model A has three alternate modes of prophylaxis: door-to-door 
dispensing, drive-thru dispensing and dispensing through pharmacies. 
The decision to open a Drive-Thru POD is based on availability of resources.  
That is, it will be opened only when resource needs (staffing and security) are met and 
can therefore be opened one by one.  However, dispensing through pharmacies and the 
door-to-door dispensing option are all-or-nothing approaches.  The speed of dispensing 
for the former option will be defined as the number of people that can be prophylaxed by 
alternate mode of dispensing per hour and for the latter option as the sum of number of 
people who can be prophylaxed by the alternate mode of dispensing per hour at all sites 
or all postal carriers.  For some of the alternatives, LAC has conducted exercises and 
therefore has detailed information on the staffing numbers and through put for the given 
mode.  Some alternatives have not yet been tested in LA County.  For these alternatives, 
the staffing and throughput numbers from the jurisdiction(s) which originally 
implemented them have been used. The overall summary of the values for each mode of 
dispensing in Model A can be found in Table 6.  The following sections detail how the 
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1. Examining Drive-Thru Dispensing 
Drive-Thru PODs have been utilized in the private sector during seasonal flu 
clinics and by the public sector during bioterrorism preparedness exercises such as in 
Hawaii in 2003.  Orange County, Florida, plans to prophylax 60% of its population using 
this option.  The plan calls for the use of ten Drive-Thru PODs with ten dispensing lanes 
each.  The expected throughput for this model is 761 heads of household, or 2,328 doses 
distributed per hour per site (based on the average family size of 3.06).  The plan requires 
a staffing of twelve medical personnel and fifty eight non-medical personnel for a total 
staff of seventy people per shift per Drive-Thru POD. Since drive-thru oral dispensing 
has not been tested in LAC, the Orange County, Florida model will be applied in the 
analysis and therefore we have a staff reduction of 4% for non-clinical staff and 0% for 
clinical staff.   
2. Examining Door-to-Door Dispensing  
The Door-to-Door Dispensing option has been a subject of heated debate in LAC 
since 2005.  It is difficult to assess the speed of dispensing for such an option because it 
has never been tested in LAC.  This option was tested in Seattle in 2007; however, these 
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numbers cannot be directly applied to LAC due to inherent differences in population, 
traffic patterns, and the total number of postal carriers available.  Based on the 
assessment provided by local USPS representatives to the LAC FPC there are 7,500 
postal routes in LAC and 3,750 postal carriers, working two routes each, could 
potentially deliver initial doses of medications to 70% of LAC’s population in less than 
twenty four hours.   
According to the United States Census Bureau there are 9,935,457 residents in 
LAC living in 3,339,763 households.  Based on the assumptions above: 
3,339,763 households * 70% of LAC’s population that can be reached = 
2,227,834 households that can be reached by 7,500 routes.  This translates to 298 
households per route. 
Since each postal employee will deliver two routes within twenty four hours we 
can reach 596 households in a twenty-four-hour period by each postal carrier.  The 
average household size in the LAC is 3.06 individuals, therefore using the postal option 
we can provide initial doses to 1824 people per twenty-four-hour period per worker.  
Therefore we can provide initial doses to seventy six people per hour per worker. 
According to the CDC, during bioterrorism events employers can expect high 
rates of absenteeism.  Local law enforcement in LAC has therefore not guaranteed one-
on-one protection for the 3,750 postal carriers to carry out this option; since it is 
voluntary on the part of the postal carriers and requires one-on-one security, the number 
of postal workers who would actually be available is probably relatively low.  We will 
assume 25% of the required workforce will be available as the worst-case scenario, based 
on security and absenteeism considerations and further test this assumption in our 
sensitivity analysis. 
Using a workforce of 25% of the postal carriers required (938 postal carriers) 
LAC can expect a speed of dispensing of 71,388 people per hour.  As the dispensing 
process would be carried out entirely by postal carriers, LAC can expect a 100% 




3. Examining Dispensing Thru Pharmacies 
Developing throughput for dispensing to the general public through pharmacies is 
extremely difficult because numbers for such an operation are not available through 
exercises either in LAC or elsewhere in the United States.  Therefore the throughput 
estimates for this analysis are mathematically derived using POD throughput data.  
During a bioterrorism event people will still need their daily medications; hence, unlike 
the postal option where all general mail delivery would be suspended, pharmacies must 
maintain their daily operations.  Therefore this analysis assumes that only a single 
pharmacist at the pharmacies will be available to dispense prophylaxis full-time, and the 
rest will carry out normal functions.  Since the ratio of clinical to non-clinical staff is 1:5 
at a traditional POD, this option will require five support staff in addition to the 
pharmacist. 
LAC plans to process 1,500 people per hour per POD using twelve clinical staff 
and sixty non-clinical staff.  Since only clinical staff will be performing the dispensing 
operation and assuming that the throughput to clinical staff ratios are equal between 
PODs and Pharmacy PODs, consider the following ratio: 
 
Throughput at Pharmacy =  Throughput at POD 
Number of Clinical Staff  Number of Clinical Staff 
 
Based on the ratio above we can estimate the throughput at the pharmacy to be 
125 people per hour.  Since the average household size in the county is 3.06, using this 
option the county could prophylax 383 people per hour at each site.  If MOUs with Sav-
on, Rite Aid or Walgreens are signed and LAC is allocated only 5% of the 1,700 
pharmacies within its borders it can still prophylax 32,555 people per hour. 
E. ASSESSING ALTERNATE MODES OF DISPENSING IN MODEL B 
Recall that in Model B, the goal is to determine the overall effectiveness of 
alternate modes of dispensing that targets a defined subset of the entire population.  
Chapter IV Model B has eight different modes of prophylaxis: Pre-positioning of 
 62
Medications for all Government Employees and their Families, Pre-positioning of 
Medications for all Hospital Patients, Staff and their Families, Dispensing of Medications 
at Private Businesses, Dispensing of Medications to SIPs, Dispensing of Medications to 
Students at Colleges and Universities, Dispensing of Medications to Hotel Chains for 
their Guests, Employees and Families of Employees, Dispensing of Medications to 
Members of Kaiser Permanente and Door-to-Door Dispensing. No exercises have 
actually taken place in the county itself to test any of the modes of dispensing listed 
above.  The estimates for the maximum number reached using each alternate mode of 
dispensing is an estimate of how many people actually fall into the subgroup being 
targeted.  The estimates for percent staff reduction are based on how each option would 
be applied in LAC, and the overall security assessment for each mode is once again based 
on the survey administered to the committee.  The overall summary of the values for each 
mode of dispensing in Model B can be found in Table 7.  The following sections detail 
how the numbers were obtained for each alternative. 
 
Table 7.   Values of Attributes for All Alternate Modes of Dispensing in Model B 
  DISPENSING OPTIONS 
Maximum 
# Reached % STAFF REDUCTION 
      CLINICAL NON-CLINICAL 
1 
Pre-positioning of Medications for 
Government Employees and their 
Families 
1,934,982 100% 100% 
2 
Pre-positioning of Medications for 
Hospital Patients, Staff and Families of 
Staff 
405,497 100% 100% 
3 Dispensing of Medications at Private Businesses 1,402,565 91.6% 68.3% 




Dispensing of Medications to Students at 
Colleges and Universities 653,243 83.3% 36.6% 
6 
Dispensing of Medications to Hotel 
Chains for their Guests, Employees and 
Families of Employees 
213,212 91.6% 68.3% 
7 Dispensing of Medications to Members of Kaiser Permanente 1,200,000 100% 100% 
8 Door-to-Door Dispensing 1,095,592 100% 100% 
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1. Pre-positioning of Medication for all Government Employees and 
Their Families 
According to the California Employment Development Department, Government 
agencies provide 14% of all employment in LAC.  According to the LA Almanac’s 
assessment of the California Employment Development Department there will be 
511,900 employees by 2008 working for local governments within LAC (LA Almanac, 
2007a). 
Taking into account the average family size of  3.78, using this pre-positioning 
option the LAC DPH could potentially prophylax 1,934,982 people.  This can be 
accomplished without using any of its staffing assets (as defined in Chapter IV) during an 
emergency.   
2. Pre-positioning of Medication for all Hospital Patients, Hospital Staff 
and Their Families 
According to the Office of Statewide Health Planning and Development at the 
California Health & Human Services Agency there are a total of 126 hospitals in LAC 
and the total bed capacity in the county is 31,132 beds with an occupancy rate of 51.9% 
(LA Almanac, 2006; Berliner, 2002).  Based on the 2003 assessment of Hospitals in LAC 
by the California Employment Development Department there are 103,000 employees 
working in the hospital system in LAC (LA Almanac, 2006). Taking into account the 
average family size of  3.78, using this pre-positioning option the LAC DPH could 
potentially prophylax 405,497 people.  This can be accomplished without using any of its 
staffing assets during an emergency.   
3. Dispensing of Medications at Private Businesses 
LAC has several large employers within its borders.  However, during an 
emergency it may not be feasible to provide medication to all of them.  For the purposes 
of this analysis we will consider the twenty five largest employers and other employers 
that deal with critical infrastructure.  Based on the research performed by LA Almanac 
and the Los Angeles Business Journal, the twenty five largest employers employ 280,219 
people (LA Almanac, 2007c).  LAC should also take into account critical infrastructure 
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industries because it is essential that transportation facilities, telecommunication, radio 
and television, waste management and water as well as electric utilities are running 
optimally.  According to the 2003 data available through the California Employment 
Development Department there are 24,000 employees working in air transportation, 
5,800 in commuter rail transportation, and 11,300 in ground transit in LAC.  There are 
12,300 employees in agencies dealing with radio and television and 28,300 employees in 
agencies dealing with telecommunication.  There are 8,100 employees working in 
companies dealing with waste management (LA Almanac, 2007a).  There are six 
agencies that provide electricity to communities within LAC however, only a single one, 
Southern California Edison, is privately run and is one of the twenty five largest 
employers in the county. Four are city-run and one is run by the county.  There are an 
additional 1,030 employees working in private companies that supply communities with 
water.  Therefore using private sector resources we can prophylax 1,402,565 people (total 
employees * average family size). Regarding staffing we will assume that the county will 
require all businesses to provide their own staff.  However, the county must still operate a 
distribution site where businesses can send representatives to pick up their medications.  
The site is basically a warehouse distribution operation and would probably require one 
clinical staff to oversee operations.  Since this is simply a distribution process and there is 
no real dispensing taking place, LHDs may require only a single clinical staff to oversee 
the process.  This distribution operation is similar to the Receipt, Store and Stage 
Warehouse (RSS Warehouse) operation outlined by the CDC to distribute and deliver 
medications to PODs.  LAC estimates that a single team required for distribution at the 
RSS Warehouse will consist of twenty members.  Using these numbers the percent staff 
reduction values for LAC are 68.3% reduction in non-clinical staff and 91.6% staff 
reduction in clinical staff.   
4. Dispensing of Medications to Sheltered in Populations 
LAC has 402 nursing homes, with a cumulative total of 38,970 beds. Of these, 
370 are considered skilled nursing facilities (The Urban County CDBG Program, 2001).  
The total residential population at these facilities is 37,600, according to the LAC 
Housing and Community Development Consolidated Plan (The Urban County CDBG 
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Program, 2001).  The plan also states that there are 43,700 people living in 1,280 
residential care facilities.  The largest sheltered in population in the LAC are the 58,975 
inmates confined to eight penitentiaries.  If residents and inmates are being prophylaxed 
it will also be critical to prophylax all staff at these facilities.  Based on the 2003 
estimates of the California Employment Development Department there were 64,400 
staff at Residential Care and Nursing Facilities (LA Almanac, 2007a).  Unfortunately no 
concrete numbers were available for the total number of employees responsible for 
inmate welfare specific to LAC.  However, according to the United States Department of 
Justice there were 2.8 inmates per employee in correctional facilities nationwide.  Using 
this ratio we will assume that there are 21,062 employees in LAC responsible for inmate 
welfare.  Since we will also be dispensing medication for family members of employees 
at all facilities we can estimate that using this option we may therefore be able to 
dispense medications to 463,321 people.  There are over 1,700 of these facilities located 
over a large area throughout LAC; it is strongly recommended that the county have one 
SIP site that serves two SPAs.  SIPs sites are a simple warehouse operation similar to the 
distribution centers being used for Dispensing Medications at Private Businesses and 
would therefore have similar staffing requirements.  However, there are eight SPAs in 
LAC; therefore the staffing requirement would be seventy six non-clinical staff and four 
clinical staff.  The percent staff reduction for non-clinical staff is therefore -5.6% and for 
clinical staff is 66.6%.  
5. Dispensing of Medications to Students at Colleges and Universities  
According to the LA Almanac there were 481,631 students enrolled in sixty one 
colleges and universities in LAC (LA Almanac, 2007d,e).  According to the California 
Employment Development Department report based on 2003 data there are 45,400 
employees working at these institutions.  Assuming that all colleges and universities have 
a health center or has pre-established contacts with a community clinic and since we plan 
to provide medications to the family of staff members we can easily estimate that we can 
prophylax 653,243 people using this option. Since there are only sixty one colleges and 
universities, LAC DPH would distribute medications to the universities and colleges with 
the largest populations first. Once again, a distribution center would be required to 
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distribute medications to the sixty one colleges and universities; LAC DPH should plan 
to have at least two distribution centers (similar to other options).  The percent staff 
reduction for this option would be 36.6% for non-clinical staff and 83.3% for clinical 
staff.   
6. Dispensing of Medications to Hotel Chains for Their Residents, 
Employees and Employee Families 
According to the California Department of Tourism there are 627 Hotels in LAC 
with an average occupancy rate of 78.5%.   There are 93,000 rooms in the LAC and there 
are approximately 24.8 million overnight visitors to LAC every year (The Convention 
and Visitors Bureau, 2007). This translates to roughly 73,005 individuals in hotels at any 
given time using a conservative estimate of one person to a room.  According to the 
California Employment Development Department there are 37,092 employees working in 
the hotel industry (LA Almanac, 2007a).  Based on this (and an average family size of 
each employee at 3.78) we can estimate to prophylax 213,212 individuals.  Since the 
highest concentration of hotels is in downtown Los Angeles the warehouse distribution 
operation to supply hotels with medication should be located close to that area.  The 
warehouse distribution operation would require twenty staff (nineteen clinical and one 
non-clinical).  The percent staff reduction for this option would therefore be 68.3% for 
non-clinical staff and 91.6% for clinical staff.   
7. Dispensing of Medications to Members of Kaiser Permanente 
Kaiser Permanente is the largest health care provider in LAC with 1.2 million 
members in the county according to the Los Angeles Business Journal (Los Angeles 
Business Journal, 1996).  A contract with Kaiser to prophylax its own staff, their families 
and all their members would significantly reduce the strain on traditional PODs.  Since 
almost all Kaiser Permanente employees and their family members are also clients of 
Kaiser Permanente we will conservatively use 1.2 million as the maximum number 
reached in the LAC.  A single large delivery would be made to a central location 
designated by Kaiser Permanente and it would be the responsibility of Kaiser Permanente 
to distribute the drugs to all facilities they plan to operate.  Since the RSS Warehouse is 
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active during POD operations, staff required for Warehouse functions of distribution do 
not count as staff specifically required for mass prophylaxis.  Therefore the percent staff 
reduction for this option will be 100% for both clinical and non-clinical staff.  
8. Door-to-Door Dispensing  
There are 1,095,592 residents of LAC living in unincorporated county areas (Los 
Angeles County, 2007). While it is generally understood that the responsibility to provide 
basic social services to these individuals lies with the LAC, there are no specific plans 
and procedures specific to this population in terms of disaster and bioterrorism 
preparedness.  If the Postal Option is used for such a targeted population we can deliver 
medications to over one million people without using any LHD staff assets.  This would 
be especially important because currently there are no traditional PODs in unincorporated 
areas in LAC and the absence of PODs here would increase the pressure on PODs located 
in neighboring cities.   
The values of all attributes, weights and bounds will be combined in Microsoft 
Excel and analyzed.  The following chapter discusses the calculations in detail as well as 



















This chapter provides an overview of the results that were obtained using the 
decision analytic model.  For both models we performed our baseline analysis using the 
average weights obtained from the LAC FPC.  Several sensitivity analyses were 
conducted to test the robustness of the results.  The first sensitivity analysis examines the 
impact of using the weights and security ratings for each alternative from the surveys 
filled out by only those members who represented a law enforcement agency.  Next, we 
examined whether changing the weights in a one-way sensitivity analysis would result in 
different choices.  A two-way sensitivity analysis of all top weights and a breakpoint 
analysis for assumptions were also performed.   
A. MODEL A 
Model A aims to serve the entire population of the county and does not 
specifically cater to any subset of the population.  The three alternate modes of 
dispensing that fall in this category are Drive-Thru Dispensing (referred to as the Drive-
Thru Option), Door-to-Door Dispensing and Dispensing to the General Public through 
Pharmacies (referred to as the Pharmacy Option). 
1. Baseline Analysis Based on Weights and Security Assessment of Law 
Enforcement Only 
According to our analysis using the average response, none of the alternate modes 
of dispensing in Model A met our ideal because no single mode performed well across all 
three attributes.  The most optimal alternate mode of dispensing was Door-to-Door 
Option, followed closely by the Pharmacy Option. The worst option in Model A was the 
Drive-Thru Option.   
Based on categorical analysis the Door-to-Door Option and the Pharmacy Option 
provided optimal reduction in clinical and non-clinical staffing as compared to a 
traditional POD.  The Door-to-Door Option provides a higher speed of dispensing as 
compared to the Pharmacy Option and both options have a higher speed of dispensing as 
compared to a traditional POD.  The Door-to-Door Option provides no added benefit in 
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terms of security, neither transportation nor site as compared to a traditional POD.  On 
the other hand, the Pharmacy Option provides added benefit in terms of security as 
compared to a traditional POD.  See Table 8 and Figure 5. 
The Drive-Thru Option provided no significant improvement in speed, staff 
reduction or transportation security over the traditional POD or any other alternate mode 
of dispensing in Model A, making it the least favorable option.   
 
Table 8.   Summary of Baseline Analysis for Model A. 
 
























0.36 0.17 0.12 0.00 0.00 0.65 
Pharmacy 
Option 
0.24 0.17 0.12 0.04 0.06 0.63 
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Figure 5.   Categorical Baseline Analysis of Model A. 
 
2. Based on Weights and Security Assessment of Law Enforcement Only 
Using the weights and the security assessment provided by members of the FSP 
who were in Law Enforcement, the Door-to-Door Option was still the most favorable 
option with an overall effectiveness of .62.  This is followed by the Pharmacy Option 
with an overall effectiveness of .50.  The overall effectiveness for both these options is 
lower than our baseline measure.  However, the drop in overall effectiveness for the 
Pharmacy Option is significant.  The major change is that the Pharmacy Option no longer 
provides any added benefit in terms of site security as compared to the traditional POD.  
However, law enforcement officials felt that the Door-to-Door Option provides slightly 
better transportation security as compared to the LAC POD but Dispensing through 
Pharmacies did not.  The Drive-Thru Option has an overall effectiveness that is much 
lower at .02 but is slightly higher than our baseline.  See Figure 6 and Table 9 for further 
details.  The remaining decline in effectiveness was due to the change in weights, as law 
enforcement officials gave a slightly higher weight to security at .4.   




























































0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.02 
Door-to-Door 
Dispensing 
0.32 0.17 0.11 0.02 0.00 0.62 
Pharmacy 
Option 
0.22 0.17 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.50 






























3. One-Way Sensitivity Analysis of Weights 
A one-way sensitivity analysis of weights is performed to understand how the 
overall effectiveness of all alternate modes of dispensing changes when one weight of 
any attribute is changed.  Since all weights must add up to 1, the two other attributes must 
retain their original proportions as set in the baseline analysis.  We will first assess the 
effects of the change in the weights for security, followed by speed of dispensing and 
finally the percent staff reduction. 
a. Based on Security Weights 
In order to assess the sensitivity of the results to a change in the weight of 
security we gradually increased the weight of security by increments of .05, ranging from 
.1 to .95.  The ratio between the weights of percent staff reduction and speed of 
dispensing were set equal to the ratio between the two at baseline such that all weights 
add up to 1. 
As seen in Figure 7, when the weight of security increases, the overall 
effectiveness of the Door-to-Door dispensing option and the Pharmacy Option decreases.  
The decrease in overall effectiveness is more pronounced in the Door-to-Door dispensing 
option.  The increase in security has a negligible positive effect on the Drive-Thru option.  
The break point between the Door-to-Door dispensing and Pharmacy Option is at 
approximately .42.  Since the weight dedicated to security by the FPC in LAC is at .35 
for Model A and ranges between .2 and .5 it is difficult to recommend one option 
between these two alternate modes of dispensing in Model A.  Only if the range of 
weights no longer includes the breakpoint can a clear recommendation be made.  If the 
lower bound of the weights rises above .42 then the Pharmacy Option is clearly the better 
option.  
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Figure 7.   One-way Sensitivity Analysis of Security Weights for Model A. 
 
b. Based on Speed of Dispensing Weights 
As in the one way analysis for security weights, the weights for the speed 
of dispensing will be increased in increments of .05 between .1 and .95.  The ratio 
between the weights of percent staff reduction and security were set equal to the ratio 
between the two at baseline, such that all weights add up to 1. 
As seen in Figure 8, when the weight on the speed of dispensing increases 
the effectiveness of the Pharmacy Option and the Door-to-Door dispensing option 
increases.  The change in the Drive-Thru POD option is negligible.  The breakpoint 
between the options is approximately at .35.  Since the weight set by the LAC FPC for 
the speed of dispensing is at .36 and ranges between .2 and .5 it is difficult to recommend 
one option over the other with great confidence at the weight set by the FPC.  However, 
as the weight on the speed of dispensing rises then the Door-to-Door dispensing option is 
























Door to Door Option
Pharmacy POD
 75
Figure 8.   One-Way Sensitivity Analysis of Speed Weights for Model A. 
 
c. Based on Percent Staff Reduction Weights 
Since the Drive-Thru POD provides no added benefit in term of staff 
reduction as determined by our upper and lower bounds and the Pharmacy Option as well 
as the Door-to-Door Option provide 100% staff reduction it can be easily determined that 
the change in the weight of percent staff reduction will have no significant effect on the 
model.  The increase and decrease in overall effectiveness of Pharmacy Option and Door-
to-Door options will be directly proportional to the increase/decrease in weight.  There 
will be no break point in this scenario. 
4. Two-Way Sensitivity Analysis of Weights 
A two-way sensitivity analysis of weights is performed to understand how the 
overall effectiveness of all alternate modes of dispensing changes when the weights of 
two attributes are changed simultaneously.  It is important to determine the change in the 




























one-way sensitivity analysis, change in the weight of staff reduction has no effect on the 
effectiveness of alternate modes of Model A.  Therefore only one two-way analysis, 
between speed of dispensing and security, was performed for Model A. 
In order to perform a two-way analysis between speed of dispensing and security 
assessment a grid analysis was required, as shown in Figure 9.  For example if the orange 
cell marked ‘both’ shows the weight of security at .1 and speed of dispensing at .1, by 
default the weight of percent staff reduction will be .8 in this scenario (recall that all 
weights must add up to 1).  The change in weights of both options was observed at 
various points. The color coded boxes show the range of weights where a given alternate 
mode of dispensing would be a better choice over others.  The black region shows the 
area where the sum of weights is greater than one, and therefore not applicable. 
 
Figure 9.   Two-way Sensitivity Analysis of Security and Speed of Dispensing for Model A. 
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If the weight of speed of dispensing and security are extremely low it is hard to 
justify choosing one option over the other.  When the weight on security increases and 
the weight on speed remains relatively low the Pharmacy Option becomes a much better 
option, but when this situation is reversed, the Door-to-Door option becomes the more 
effective option. 
5. Analysis of Assumptions for Model A 
Since most alternate modes of dispensing have never been tested it is necessary to 
estimate values such as the number of pharmacies that are being utilized in the Pharmacy 
Option.  In a real contract these numbers can vary and it therefore becomes necessary to 
understand how the changes in these numbers affect the output of the model. 
a. Changes in POD Baseline 
The traditional POD option has been tested on several occasions.  Since 
the traditional POD is used as a baseline to set the upper and lower bounds of our 
analysis, it is important to assess the impact a change in speed of POD will have on our 
output.  Model A was run using the throughput values of 500, 1,000 and 1,500 people per 
hour and the upper and lower bounds of speed were adjusted accordingly.  The output is 
shown in Figure 10.  If the throughput at PODs in LAC is lower than 1000 people per 
hour, then the Pharmacy Option is the optimal alternate dispensing solution.  As the thru 
put at PODs increases over 1000 people per hour the overall effectiveness of the 
Pharmacy option decreases.  A cross over point between the pharmacy option and the 
door to door dispensing option appears at around the throughput of 1300 people per hour.  
A through put above this point results as the pharmacy option become a less effective 
option as compared to the door to door dispensing option.  The overall effectiveness of 
the door to door option does not seem to be influenced greatly by changes in through put.  
While lowering the classic POD speed makes the Drive-Thru Option more appealing, it is 





Figure 10.   Effects of the Change in Baseline for Model A. 
 
b. Changes in the Number of Postal Carriers 
In the assessment for LAC we assumed that 25% of the required 3750 
workforce of postal carriers reported for duty (Indicated by the Red Arrow in Figure 11).  
Increasing the percent of postal carriers will not affect the overall efficiency because at 
20% the speed is already higher than the upper bound.  However, it is important to 
understand how the output would change if the number of postal carriers reporting for 
duty is reduced.  To test the assumption the model was run several times by reducing the 


















































































If fewer than 15% of postal carriers report for duty then the Door-to-Door 
option drops below the Pharmacy Option.  However, even if only 1% of postal carriers 
report for duty, the Door-to-Door option is still much more efficient than the Drive-thru 
option and the traditional POD as it provides 100% reduction in staffing. 
c. Changes in the Number of Pharmacies Dispensing Prophylaxis 
For the Pharmacy Option, the model assumed that LAC can obtain a 
contract with 5% of the 1700 pharmacies in LAC (Indicated by the Red Arrow in Figure 
12).  It is important to test this assumption and assess the effects on the output if the 
number of pharmacies that has been contracted increases or decreases.  The effects of 










































































































If the number of pharmacies is increased by one percent, then the 
Pharmacy Option becomes the best alternate mode of dispensing.  Even if only one 
percent of pharmacies in LAC are used the option is still better than the Drive-Thru POD 
and traditional POD options as it still provides a higher speed, 100% reduction in staffing 
and added security benefits. 
As seen after performing all analysis for Model A, the Drive-Thru option 
under no scenario is a viable option for LAC, because it provides no added benefit in 
terms of speed of dispensing, percent reduction in staffing and security. 
B. MODEL B 
Model B serves specific subsets of the population of the county.  There are eight 
alternate modes of dispensing that fall into this category.   The baseline for comparison is 
the classic POD. 
1. Pre-positioning of Medications for Government Employees and 
their Families (Civil Service Option) 
2. Pre-positioning of Medications for Hospital Patients, Staff and 
Families of the Staff (Hospital Option) 
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3. Dispensing of Medications at Private Businesses (Private Sector 
Option) 
4. Dispensing of Medications to SIPS Option 
5. Dispensing of Medications to Students at Colleges and Universities 
(University Option) 
6. Dispensing of Medications to Hotel Chains for their Guests, 
Employees and Families of Employees (Hotel Option) 
7. Dispensing of Medications to Members of Kaiser Permanente 
(Kaiser Option) 
8. Door-to-Door Dispensing (Door-to-Door Option) 
1. Baseline Analysis Based on Weights and Security Assessment of Law 
Enforcement Only 
Based on our baseline analysis using average weights for each criteria as provided 
by the members of the FPC we found that the Civil Service Option had the highest 
overall effectiveness followed by the Kaiser Option.  The two options that had the lowest 
overall effectiveness were the SIPS Option and the Hotel Option.  To see the overall 
effectiveness for each alternative see Table 10 and Figure 11. 
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Table 10.   Summary of Baseline Analysis for Model B. 
 
 





























0.35 0.19 0.12 0.05 0.08 0.79 
Hospital POD 0.04 0.19 0.12 0.06 0.08 0.49 
Business POD 0.24 0.17 0.10 0.03 0.06 0.60 
SIPs Option 0.05 0.13 0.00 0.03 0.10 0.30 
University POD 0.09 0.16 0.03 0.03 0.08 0.38 
Hotel POD 0.00 0.17 0.10 0.03 0.04 0.35 
Kaiser POD 0.22 0.19 0.12 0.03 0.09 0.65 
Door-to-Door 
Dispensing 
0.18 0.19 0.12 0.00 0.00 0.49 








































All options have an overall effectiveness higher than the traditional POD.  Four of 
the eight options provide LAC with 100% reduction in clinical and non-clinical staffing.   
2. Based on Weights and Security Assessment of Law Enforcement Only 
Based on the security assessment and weights of Law Enforcement 
representatives of the FPC, the Civil Service Option and the Kaiser POD are still the top 
two options.  However, the overall effectiveness of both options is lower than our 
baseline.  The overall effectiveness of the Hospital Option, University PODs and SIPS 
Option has increased.  The major difference based on the comparison of Law 
Enforcement inputs and the entire FPC input is that according to Law Enforcement 
representatives, the Hospital Option would have a higher overall effectiveness than the 
Business POD.  See Table 11 and Figure 12. 
 
Table 11.   Summary of Law Enforcement Analysis for Model B. 
 
 
























0.33 0.16 0.09 0.05 0.08 0.71 
Hospital POD 0.04 0.16 0.09 0.17 0.10 0.56 
Business POD 0.23 0.15 0.08 0.00 0.06 0.51 
SIPs Option 0.05 0.11 0.00 0.05 0.11 0.31 
University 
POD 
0.08 0.14 0.02 0.01 0.09 0.34 
Hotel POD 0.00 0.15 0.08 0.04 0.06 0.32 
Kaiser POD 0.21 0.16 0.09 0.05 0.09 0.60 
Door-to-Door 
Dispensing 
0.17 0.16 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.42 
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Figure 14.   Categorical Law Enforcement Analysis for Model B. 
 
3. One-Way Sensitivity Analysis of Weights 
Recall that a one-way sensitivity analysis of weights looks at the overall 
effectiveness of all alternatives when the weight of one attribute is changed, leaving the 
other two proportionally constant.  The analysis will first assess the effects of the change 
in the weights for security, followed by percent staff reduction and finally maximum 
numbers reached by increasing the weight for the selected attribute in increments of .05 
between .1 and .95. 
a. Based on Security Weights 
As seen in Figure 13, the top three options (the Civil Service Option, 
Business POD and Kaiser POD) as seen in our baseline are negatively influenced by an 
increase in the weight for security.  However, the Civil Service Option remains the most 
effective option and is matched by the Hospital POD option at the weight of .95.  A few 
important breakpoints are brought to light in the analysis.  If the weight on security is 
higher than .8 it would be fairly difficult to make a recommendation between the Kaiser 
POD, Civil Service Option and the Hospital POD Option.  At a weight of .6 it would be 
fairly difficult to judge the third best option between the Hospital POD and the Business 









































POD Options.  However, if the weight on security in LAC is below .55 then the top three 
options are the Civil Service Option, Kaiser POD Option and the Business POD Option.  
 
Figure 15.   One-way Sensitivity Analysis of Security Weights for Model B. 
 
 
b. Based on Percent Staff Reduction Weights 
As seen in Figure 14, an increased weight on staffing increases the overall 
effectiveness of all alternate modes of dispensing.  The top three options, if the weight on 
percent staff reduction is below .67 are the Civil Service Option, Kaiser POD Option and 
the Business POD Option.  However, there is a break point at .67 above which the 
Business POD is no longer the third best option and is replaced by the Door to Door 






































Figure 16.   One-way Sensitivity Analysis of Percent Staff Reduction for Model B. 
 
c. Based on Maximum Number Reached 
As shown in Figure 15, the Civil Service Option is least affected by the 
change in weight for the maximum number reached and would therefore be the most 
optimal option at any weight for this attribute.  The Kaiser POD, Business POD and 
Hospital POD Option are all negatively influenced by an increase in the weight of this 
attribute.  There are some important break points that have come to light in this analysis.  
If the weight for maximum number reached is low it will be difficult to judge between the 
Hospital POD and Business POD Options as their break point is at approximately .23 and 
either could be one of the top three options.  At the other end of the spectrum if the 
weight for maximum number reached is around .75 then the Kaiser POD or the Business 
POD could be the second best option after the Civil Service Option.  As the weight on 
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Figure 17.   One-way Sensitivity Analysis of Maximum Number Reached for Model B. 
 
4. Two-Way Sensitivity Analysis of Weights 
Recall that a two-way sensitivity analysis of weights is performed to understand 
how the overall effectiveness of all alternate modes of dispensing changes when the 
weights of two attributes are changed simultaneously. The analysis is similar to that of 
Model A, but all three combinations of attributes were tested in Model B.  The shading in 
the grid represents the top two options unless otherwise noted. 
a. Based on Security and Maximum Number Reached Weights 
As shown in Figure 16, the Civil Service Option and the Kaiser POD are 
the top two options regardless the weight on the maximum number reached when the 
weight on security is medium to low.  When the weight on the maximum number reached 
is high, the Business POD Option becomes a viable choice.  Finally when the weight on 
security is higher, the Hospital POD Option replaces the Kaiser POD Option as one of the 
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b. Based on Security and Percent Staff Reduction Weights 
As seen in Figure 17, when the weights on security and percent staff 
reduction are extremely low, the top two choices are the Civil Service Option and the 
Hospital POD.  As the weight on percent staff reduction rises above .1, the Civil Service 
Option and the Kaiser POD will be the top two choices regardless of the weight on 
security.  When the weight on security increases above .6 and on percent staff reduction 
remains low the Business POD Option begins to replace the Kaiser POD Option as the 
top two choices. 
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Figure 19.   Two-way Sensitivity Analysis of Security and Percent Staff Reduction for Model 
B. 
 
c. Based on Maximum Number Reached and Percent Staff 
Reduction Weights 
As seen in Figure 18, when the weights on maximum number reached and 
percent staff reduction are extremely low, the top two choices are the Civil Service 
Option and the Hospital POD.  As the weight on percent staff reduction rises above .1, 
the Civil Service Option and the Kaiser POD will be the top two choices regardless of the 
weight on the maximum number reached.  When the weight on maximum number 
reached increases above .6 and on percent staff reduction remains low the Business POD 
Option begins to replace the Kaiser POD Option as the top two choices. 
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Figure 20.   Two-way Sensitivity Analysis of Maximum Number Reached and Percent Staff 
Reduction for Model B. 
 
 
5. Analysis of Assumptions for Model B 
Since traditional PODs also served as the baseline for Model B it is essential to 
test the effects of the change in POD throughput on the output of Model B.  The model 
was run assuming throughputs of 500 people per hour and 1,000 people per hour.  





C. SUMMARY OF RESULTS 
As seen in Model A, unless the weights for speed of dispensing and security are at 
extremes it is difficult to justify either the Door-to-Door Option or the Pharmacy Option 
more efficient than the other.  As seen in Model B, the Civil Service Option will always 
be the most effective for LAC, followed closely by the Kaiser POD Option.  However, 
when security and maximum number reached approach extremely values, the Hospital 
POD Option and the Business POD Option begin to compete with the Kaiser POD 

























This chapter discusses the uncertainty of data in Model A and Model B and 
determines that the results obtained in Chapter VI are robust and applicable.  The chapter 
also provides a discussion on the acceptability of results, pitfalls that LHDs must consider 
as they develop portfolios of various options, considerations with respect to the special 
needs population, and ensuring that the gaps left behind by the POD-based approach are 
addressed by the alternate modes of dispensing.  Finally, this chapter identifies barriers 
and solutions to implementation of the results, provides a scope for future research, and 
presents the conclusion of this research. 
A. UNCERTAINTY OF DATA 
Since most alternate modes of dispensing have never been tested, it is difficult to 
derive the numbers for speed of dispensing and staffing, both clinical and non-clinical, as 
needed in Model A.  Most of the numbers were derived by mathematical analysis and 
comparison of the alternate mode of dispensing to the traditional POD in a given LHD’s 
jurisdiction.  Similarly it is difficult to ascertain the exact value of the maximum number 
reached and staffing as required in Model B.  It is impossible to estimate the exact 
number of partners (be it cities in the Civil Service Option or Private Businesses in the 
Business PODs option) that would like to partner with the LHD in mass prophylaxis until 
an official MOU is signed between agencies.  At the same time the number of employees 
in the partner agencies is dynamic and hard to track accurately.  Staffing requirements 
during a mass prophylaxis event also may not be accurately estimated until MOU’s are 
signed.  This is because some large employers or large universities may not have the 
medical staff to prophylax everyone and may require help from the LHD.  Similarly, the 
weights and security ratings are averages of an individual decision maker preference and 
therefore susceptible to change.  
Since establishing accurate values can be time consuming and expensive, an 
optimal solution can be to estimate raw values of speed of dispensing, maximum number  
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reached and staffing for a preliminary analysis and then test the susceptibility of the 
output to change.  This approach was used in Chapter VI via sensitivity analysis and 
testing assumptions.   
1. Model A – Sensitivity Analysis and Assumptions 
Recall that a one way sensitivity analysis was performed in Model A for each 
attribute by gradually increasing the weights of an attribute by increments of .05 from .1 
to .95.  As seen in Chapter VI, when the weight of security was assessed, a breakpoint (a 
point where two options cross each other for overall effectiveness) arose.  If the security 
weights are low (i.e. security is deemed less important with respect to speed and staffing 
requirements), the door to door option is the preferred option, but if the security weights 
are high (i.e. security is deemed more important with respect to speed and staffing 
requirements) then the pharmacy dispensing option is the preferred option.  This is 
because the security requirements (assessed on a scale of one to ten) are much higher for 
the door to door dispensing option as compared to the pharmacy option thereby 
influencing both options at different rates and creating the breakpoint.  When the attribute 
‘speed of dispensing’ was assessed, another breakpoint appeared.  If speeds of dispensing 
weights are low (i.e. speed is deemed less important with respect to security and staffing 
requirements) then the pharmacy option is the preferred option, but if the speeds of 
dispensing weights are high (i.e. speed is deemed more important with respect to security 
and staffing requirements) then the door to door option is the preferred option.  This is 
because the speed of dispensing for the pharmacy option is lower than that of the door to 
door dispensing option.  These results were also seen in the two way sensitivity analysis 
between security and speed of dispensing.  When the weights for both attributes are low, 
both options seem equally efficient.  However, when security weights are from moderate 
to high the door to door dispensing option is confirmed as the best option, however, when 
the weights for speed of dispensing are high the pharmacy option is confirmed as the best 
option.  When the weights between speed and security are approximately equal, the top 




reduction does not influence the outcome because both options provide 100% staff 
reduction both clinical and non clinical staff.  The influence of all weights on the drive 
thru dispensing option is negligible.   
Since some of the values used in the analysis were based on certain assumptions, 
it was essential to estimate the effects on the outcome if our assumptions were 
manipulated.  Our first assumption was the speed of dispensing at each point of 
dispensing that was used to set our upper and lower bounds.  The door to door dispensing 
option seemed to be independent of any changes to the baseline speed of dispensing 
between 500 people per hour and 1500 people per hour.  The pharmacy option’s overall 
effectiveness began to decrease when the speed of dispensing was higher than 1000 
people per hour.  Finally, there was a breakpoint at around 1300 people per hour where 
door to door dispensing became the most efficient option.  The drive thru option failed to 
significantly change based on changes in baseline.   
A second assumption in Model A was that LAC had only 25% of the 3,750 
workers needed to dispense medication door to door.  The model was run several times 
by reducing the workforce by 5% and finally at 1%.  At baseline the door to door option 
was the best option but dropped just below the Pharmacy option when the workforce was 
reduced to 15%.  With the workforce at 1% the door to door dispensing option was still 
the second best option, and was still a much better option than drive thru dispensing. 
The final major assumption in Model A was the use of 5% of pharmacies in Los 
Angeles County.  This number is dynamic and therefore will not be set till all MOUs 
have been signed between pharmacies and LAC.  As seen in our analysis when the 
number of pharmacies available is increased by only 1% the pharmacy option becomes 
the most optimal option.  Finally if only one percent of pharmacies are used the pharmacy 
option is still a much better option than the drive thru POD. 
Therefore, as seen in the sensitivity analysis and testing of assumption the output 
of data from Model A is robust.  Drastic changes in the input do not have drastic changes 
in the output making the model less susceptible to change.  Therefore, although the data 
may have some uncertainties, the Door to Door option and the Pharmacy Option are the 
two best options in LAC to dispense medications to the general public.  The drive thru 
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option is the worst option in LAC.  Given the baseline values, the top two options are 
practically indistinguishable.  If there is a need to distinguish between them more detailed 
data with a great precision of accuracy is required.  However, other characteristics not 
captured in the model may guide the final choice and either option would be acceptable. 
2. Model B – Sensitivity Analysis and Assumptions 
As seen at baseline in Model B, the Civil Service Option, Business POD and 
Kaiser POD are the top three options in terms of overall efficiency.  According to the one 
way sensitivity analysis of the security weights, the civil service option and the Kaiser 
POD will remain as two of the top three options no matter what the weight on security.  
The hospital POD would replace the Business POD as the third option at very high 
weights of security.  This is because the security rating (based on the scale of one to ten) 
for the Business POD is higher than that of the hospital POD.  When one way sensitivity 
analysis is performed on the weights of percent staff reduction, the top three choices are 
the Civil Service Option, Business POD and Kaiser POD, with the Door to Door 
dispensing option replacing the Business POD option at extremely high weights.  This is 
because the door to door option requires no staff, as defined in Chapter IV, where as the 
Business POD option requires running of a small warehouse like operation.  When one 
way sensitivity analysis is performed on the weights of maximum number reached the top 
three options are still Civil Service Option, Business POD and Kaiser POD except at very 
low weights where Business POD is replaced by the Hospital PODs as the most efficient 
option.  Although the third best option changes based on the scenario, it is set that the 
Civil Service Option and Kaiser POD work well at any weight of any attribute. 
As seen in the two way sensitivity analysis of all three possible combinations of 
the attributes, the Civil Service Option and the Kaiser Option all grids with an additional 
option appearing at the extremes (See Figure 18, 19 and 20).  Therefore, the Civil Service 
Option and the Kaiser POD are worth developing under any circumstance as they are not 
influenced significantly by drastic changes in weights of any attribute. 
A major assumption that was seen in Model B was the upper and lower bounds 
were based on the traditional POD data.  Upon changing the baseline POD thru put no 
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significant change were observed in the model.  Therefore the output of Model B in this 
case is independent of the changes in POD data. 
As seen thus far, the uncertainties of data can be addressed by sensitivity analysis 
and testing of assumptions.  This analysis answers the ‘what if?’ question and shows 
decision makers how prone their conclusion is to change.  Even though there are 
uncertainties and assumptions in our data they do not influence the outcome of Model A 
or Model B.  The top options in both models remain the same even after drastic changes 
to the input values thus making these uncertainties irrelevant.  As see in Model A and 
Model B the top options remained the same under a full range of weights and drastic 
values of all assumptions.  We can therefore confidently conclude that our results are 
very robust and therefore the uncertainties are less worrisome. 
B. ACCEPTABILITY OF RESULTS 
Recall that security assessments and weights in our example were obtained using 
a survey that was administered to the FPC in LAC that is comprised of over 50 members.  
However, only 17 members attended the session where the survey was administered 
along with a short presentation.  The rest of the members received the presentation and 
survey via email along with a brief letter explaining the purpose.  None of the members 
that received the survey via email returned their responses.  At the same time, of the 
seventeen members that did attend the session two members from the law enforcement 
community refused to participate in the survey for personal reasons, leaving only fifteen 
viable surveys.  LHDs that plan to implement this process should increase this sample 
size by administering this survey to several emergency preparedness and force protection 
committees as well as other stakeholders in the mass prophylaxis process.  Increasing this 
sample size will provide a more representative view of security assessment as well as 
weights of various attributes.   
Furthermore in order to obtain interagency buy-in all stakeholders should be 
involved in the process to develop the objective hierarchy.  As seen in the section above 
the preliminary results obtained from our analysis are robust, valid and applicable.  
However, they solely represent the public health point of view.  Involving stakeholders 
early in the process will give all stakeholders an equal opportunity to voice their concerns 
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during the creation of the objective hierarchy.  The new hierarchy developed by 
consensus may contain attributes that do not reflect public health concerns, but having 
buy-in from all stakeholders can greatly reduce complications during implementation.    
C. PORTFOLIOS 
If LHDs have enough resources, they may choose to implement a portfolio of 
alternate modes of dispensing.  In Models A and B, the alternate modes of dispensing 
were evaluated as separate, stand-alone options.  Portfolio analysis raises a number of 
issues such as double counting of the numbers that can be reached.  For example, recall 
that for LAC the most effective options under Model B were the Business POD Option 
and Kaiser POD.  The next best alternatives were the Civil Service Option and Hospital 
POD. Kaiser Permanente, which is a major HMO in LAC, would provide prophylaxis to 
all its members, staff and their families.  In LAC several large businesses that may be 
targeted by the Business POD option provide health insurance to their employees via 
contracts with Kaiser Permanente.  Similarly, many civil service agencies provide health 
insurance to their employees via Kaiser Permanente.  Kaiser Permanente also owns 
hospitals in LAC, and Kaiser is also one of the top 25 employers in LAC.  Since Kaiser 
Permanente influences several other options if a portfolio is created using the top four 
options, it is important for decision makers not to overestimate the number of people that 
can be reached using the portfolio.  Under counting can also be an issue in a portfolio, 
because the USPS Option only provides individuals with the initial doses of the 
prophylaxis in order to buy time for LHDs to establish PODs. Therefore if an LHD 
chooses to incorporate multiple options in their jurisdiction as their mass prophylaxis 
strategy, they must be aware of this issue to correctly estimate how many people may be 
prophylaxed outside of PODs.  Nevertheless, portfolios are important in major 
metropolitan areas that have a higher than average population because a combination of 
options may be required to sufficiently reduce the pressure on PODs.  However, decision 




D. SPECIAL NEEDS POPULATION 
As seen so far, the SIPs option in Model B is the only option that serves the 
special needs population in LAC.  The SIPs option is unique compared to other options 
because it serves a population that is not targeted by any other option.  Similarly during 
an emergency the special needs population in LAC may face many logistical barriers 
getting to the closest POD.  In the worst case scenario like Katrina, there is a fear that 
those responsible for caring for the special needs population may abandon them in order 
to protect themselves and their families (Vestal, 2005).  Even if the members of the 
special needs population have access to modes of transportation to the POD, they may 
have to wait for several hours outside exposed to the elements in order to obtain their 
medications, unnecessarily putting their health at risk. (Los Angeles County Operation 
Chimera, 2003).  The SIPs option has fairly low staffing and security requirements and 
serves a population that is in need of critical care during an emergency as seen during 
Katrina (Vestal, 2003).  Therefore, although the SIPs option is not seen as an efficient 
option for mass prophylaxis, it may very well be the only means of providing prophylaxis 
to the special needs population in LAC.  The SIPs option should therefore be given 
special consideration and implemented in LAC.  
E. HAVE MASS PROPHYLAXIS CHALLENGES BEEN ADDRESSED BY 
ALTERNATE MODES OF DISPENSING? 
Recall from Chapter II that the third annual report, Ready or Not? Protecting the 
Public’s Health from Disease, Disasters and Bioterrorism, the Trust for America’s 
Health determined that LHDs are significantly under- prepared to respond to bioterrorism 
events.  Eighty five percent of the states as well as the federal government received a 
failing grade for activities related to bioterrorism preparedness and response (Trust for 
America’s Health, 2006).  Engaging communities using alternate modes of dispensing 
will increase public awareness and help LHDs prepare to respond to a large scale 
bioterrorism attack by sharing responsibility.   
The responsibility to provide public health service in the United States mostly lies 
with the LHD, because the federal government and most states have planning and 
advisory roles.  As seen during the smallpox campaign, LHDs do not have the 
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infrastructure to support mass prophylaxis (Santiago, 2006; Mitchel, 2005).  Building 
relationships with major businesses, HMOs, Universities and other local governments can 
help reduce this gap in infrastructure by utilizing previously untapped resources.  For 
example, LHDs may not be able to find suitable sites to serve as PODs, but utilizing 
alternate modes of dispensing they may not need as many sites.   
Similarly LHD are typically understaffed to run daily functions and there is 
massive surge in the need for staff during an emergency.  This means that POD staffing 
will be completely dependant on volunteers (Flynn, 2004).  Since LHDs have only 48 
hours to prophylax their entire population, staff procurement issues can be particularly 
burdensome.  Due to this constraint, most LHDs will not be able to set up and operate all 
PODs at once further shrinking the time window available for prophylaxis.  Additionally, 
LHDs must deal with credentialing, training and spontaneous volunteers.  Using alternate 
modes of dispensing reduce, if not completely eliminate, these problems.  Corporations 
typically maintain personnel files which include credentialing of their staff, they have 
updated call down rosters for all their staff as a part of their business continuity plan.  
Since they would be involved in the planning and response processes it would be their 
responsibility to set up PODs and procure staffing, reducing the pressure on LHDs.  In 
almost all cases, family members will be provided with prophylaxis, thus encouraging 
employees to return to work and minimize losses for corporations.   
Since the security requirements at a POD are directly proportional to the number 
of people coming to PODs, alternate modes of dispensing will reduce pressure on local 
law enforcement agencies and reduce traffic control issues.  Corporations typically have 
contracts with private security service firms and this could be a great opportunity to build 
a partnership between the two by sharing security responsibilities. 
F. BARRIERS AND SOLUTIONS TO IMPLEMENTATION 
Once an LHD has established which alternate modes of dispensing will best serve 
the needs of their jurisdiction, based on the multi-attribute decision-making models 
discussed in this paper, it will face a new challenge regarding implementing its findings.  
As discussed by Chan and Mauborgne in the book, “Blue Ocean Strategy” it is difficult 
for any agency to create an operational plan from their strategic plan (Chan, 2005).  This 
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is because putting ideas into motion, according to Chan and Mauborgne, involves four 
hurdles – cognitive, motivation, resource, and political.  The problems posed by one 
hurdle and the solutions to it may often influence the problems posed by other hurdles 
(Chan, 2005). 
The cognitive hurdle in this case deals with making the stakeholders aware of the 
issues that the traditional POD option faces today and the need for change (Chan, 2005).  
The largest and the most influential stakeholder by far in the preparedness efforts of this 
country is the community.  The Oklahoma City/County Health Department faced this 
cognitive hurdle as they tried to implement their SIPs plan (Public Health Training 
Network, 2006).  Their early attempts to make the stakeholder (the SIPs) community see 
the need for a SIPs plan were failures because they failed to explain to the community 
what they didn’t understand (Public Health Training Network, 2006).  Most nursing 
homes and assisted living facilities had in house physicians or pharmacists and they were 
under the impression that they would get their prophylactic medications from them.  
When this issue was brought to light, the health department informed them that the SNS 
was a federal asset and their contracted physician or pharmacist may not have enough 
drugs to prophylax all residents for an extended period of time.  This single piece of 
information boosted the number of participants significantly (Public Health Training 
Network, 2006).   However, this problem may not be isolated to SIPs plan only.  Most 
large businesses, HMOs, government agencies, private hospitals and hotels provide 
health insurance to their employees.  Similarly, colleges and universities provide student 
health insurance.  They may not foresee the problems that may arise during an emergency 
as they may believe their employees can get their medications from their primary 
physician.  Due to this single chain of thought they may not see the potential impact of a 
bioterrorism event on their day to day activities.  Providing stakeholders with such 
critical information is key to sway their opinion and overcome this cognitive barrier.  As 
noted by the Oklahoma City/County Health Department clear communication with 
decision makers in the community is key to overcome cognitive hurdles (Public Health 
Training Network, 2006). 
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The motivational hurdle deals with mobilizing stakeholders to take action (Chan, 
2005).  The question LHDs must ask themselves is what incentives or benefits will make 
stakeholders act.  As stated earlier the largest stakeholder is the community.  The sectors 
of the community that will be involved in the alternate modes of dispensing will often 
take cost benefit analyses of the shared responsibility into account.  The Southern Nevada 
Health District (SNHD) that includes Las Vegas deals with a fluctuating population as 
Las Vegas has over 300,000 tourists on peak days (Public Health Training Network, 
2006).  They overcame the cognitive hurdle by making the resorts and casinos aware of 
the problem through a relationship with the ‘Hotel Security Chiefs Association’(Public 
Health Training Network, 2006).  However, this was not enough; they faced a 
motivational hurdle to get the resorts and casinos to partner up with them on this 
problem.  Resorts and casinos completely depend on keeping their doors open to make 
profit. In order to achieve this they need two things, 1.) Staff to run the resort and 2.) 
People to stay at the resort and enjoy the activities offered in the casinos.  In terms of a 
cost benefit analysis, the threat of a bioterrorism attack in Las Vegas is high; if a 
bioterrorism attack does take place the staff will potentially abandon their post and go to 
PODs to get prophylaxis for themselves and their families; finally panic will ensue and 
people will rush out of the resorts and casinos.  This will lead to huge economic 
implications for the resorts and casino owners (Public Health Training Network, 2006).  
Keeping the casinos open to minimize economic loss would be in the best interest of the 
resorts and casinos.  In order to do this, they need to provide prophylaxis to their staff and 
families as well as their guests.  The resorts and casinos were now ready to share mass 
prophylaxis responsibility with the LHD by setting up a closed POD for employees, their 
families and their guests.  Competition between businesses can be a good source to 
overcome the motivational barrier as seen in Las Vegas, when one business acts on an 
issue its lead competitors tend to follow (Public Health Training Network, 2006).  If 
LHDs are successful in convincing one stakeholder there is a good chance that other 
competitors will follow. 
The third hurdle to implementation is resources.  Recall the argument by Flynn 
that due to state and local budget constraints most LHD are understaffed to run their daily 
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functions (Flynn, 2006).  It may therefore not be possible for an LHD to create 
partnership with all potential alternate modes of dispensing stakeholders.  This is 
especially true as some alternate modes of dispensing may have several stakeholder 
whose cooperation is required for the success of the option.  For example, in LAC there 
are 402 skilled nursing homes and 1,280 residential care facilities, it would be a 
monumental task for the LHD to pull together all facilities (The Urban County CDBG 
Program, 2001).  Similarly, if LAC is to pull together all civil service agencies, large 
businesses, businesses that deal with critical infrastructure, hospitals, colleges and 
universities or HMOs it will be a huge burden for the limited staff available.  Hence 
knowing which mode to target first based on multi attribute decision analysis is critical.  
Las Vegas tried to overcome the resource hurdle by working with the ‘Hotel Security 
Chiefs Association’ that has representation from almost all resorts and casinos in Las 
Vegas (Public Health Training Network, 2006).  Similarly LAC is trying to establish a 
relationship with the Business Executives for National Security (BENS) to communicate 
with all major businesses in its jurisdiction and to help “state/local business organizations 
and government leaders build their own self-sustaining regional partnerships” (BENS, 
2007).  As seen in our examples it is best to build a relationship with a single entity such 
as an organization that boasts your community stakeholders as its members. 
The final hurdle and potentially the most difficult hurdle to overcome is the 
political hurdle.  The best way to overcome this hurdle is make the political leaders into 
stakeholders by eliminating the cognitive hurdle on their part (Chan, 2005).  To address 
equitability of response LHDs should maintain transparency that includes logical 
reasoning of their decision makers.   
Any variance in the manner of delivery of the prophylaxis may be perceived as 
preferential treatment; therefore a strong public relations campaign is essential to 
obtaining political support.  Once public acceptability is met, the political acceptability 
will follow.  In all cases obtaining early buy in of political leaders, from all partnering 
agencies, can have a profound impact on this hurdle.  Interagency support can flourish 
through strong political leadership that is willing to negotiate with other agencies and 
make concessions.   
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G. FUTURE RESEARCH 
As this paper has shown thus far, alternate modes of dispensing are important 
solutions to the problems posed by POD-based mass prophylaxis problems and that multi 
attribute decision analysis is an important tool for LHDs to analyze which alternate 
modes of dispensing can be the most beneficial in their jurisdiction.  However, there are 
still several issues surrounding alternate modes of dispensing that remain unanswered. 
1. Costs 
In order for LHDs to set up any alternate mode of dispensing they must incur 
certain costs associated with creating strategic and operational plans associated with each 
alternate mode of dispensing.  The costs associated with alternate modes of dispensing 
break down into two major subcategories, preplanning costs and implementation costs.  
Preplanning costs are the costs associated with setting up an option, whereas 
implementation costs are the cost incurred when the option is implemented during an 
emergency.  Both costs can be difficult to define, estimate or measure and can range from 
work-hours lost to the project, employee salary and benefits, contractor fees and travel.  
In the objective hierarchy seen in this paper, the cost of setting up an alternate mode of 
dispensing and implementing it was not considered.  Nevertheless, these costs are an 
important attribute that is often taken into account by decision makers in the public and 
private sectors alike.  Although cost of implementation may be overlooked during an 
emergency, it is very unlikely that public and private partners would ignore the need to 
estimate both costs during the preplanning phase.  Therefore, further analysis is necessary 
to accurately estimate the cost of alternate modes of dispensing. 
2. Cost-Benefit Analysis 
LHDs and partners involved in alternate modes of dispensing may experience 
several benefits from cooperation in mass prophylaxis efforts.  For the LHDs the 
partnership makes the problem a community oriented problem and organizes private 
partners fill the gaps that LHDs may not be able to.  This partnership also reduces the 
pressure on PODs by reducing the over dependency on volunteers to staff them and 
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reducing the number of people going to PODs.  This indirectly also reduces pressure on 
law enforcement as some options require minimum security or provide for private 
security.  On the other hand, it keeps business running with a sense of normalcy in the 
wake of a bioterrorism attack, reduces employee absenteeism and improves the 
relationship between private businesses and their community/workforce.  But all these 
benefits come at a cost.  Politically, LHDs may be accused of favoritism for exercising 
one option and not the other.  LHDs may be dragged into litigations due to the negligence 
of partner agencies during mass prophylaxis.  Similarly, partner agencies face litigation 
from injuries occurring from medications or at the dispensing site.  Businesses from the 
private sector must also consider the social stigma of many potentially infected 
individuals coming to their sites to collect medications.  Private partners must also 
consider the position of their insurance companies that may revoke their insurance claims 
resulting from injuries as dispensing medications is not a part of their normal operations 
(Smith, 2007).  There is not doubt that LHDs and partner agencies benefit from the 
implementation of alternate modes of dispensing but it is also important to quantify what 
they are risking or giving up.  Therefore an indepth cost-benefit analysis on behalf of the 
LHDs and their private partners is needed. 
3. Legal Issues 
There are several legal issues, liability in particular, that may hinder the 
implementation of any mass prophylaxis plan, including traditional PODs.  Chester Lee 
Smith, from the Georgia Division of Public Health hosted several meetings with BENS 
members and their legal representatives between October 2003 to January 2007.  During 
these meetings it emerged that the liability issue was of great concern to all potential 
partners in the private sector (Smith, 2007).  The BENS members at these meetings 
recommended a new legislation or changes in current legislation such as the state ‘Good 
Samaritan’ law that would protect them from legal liability and litigation occurring from 
incidental injuries but not from willful negligence (Smith, 2007).  Since most partners in 
almost all alternate modes of dispensing that have been identified and tested in this paper 
are a part of the private sector, it is crucial to lay the liability issue to rest through further 
research before progress can be made. 
 106
H. CONCLUSION 
The anthrax attacks in the United States have shown that civilian population is 
vulnerable to terrorist attacks involving bacterial pathogens (Lee, 2007).  The concept of 
using PODs to dispense prophylaxis available through the SNS will clearly be unable to 
prophylax entire populations in 48 hour due to resource restrictions.  Alternate modes of 
prophylaxis are therefore required to reduce the pressure on and fill the gaps left unfilled 
by our current approach. 
Based on extensive review of literature review ten alternate modes of dispensing 
that are considered best practices were identified. Qualitative analysis cannot directly 
assess the efficiency of these alternate modes of dispensing.  This is because each 
alternate mode of dispensing has certain strong attributes that make it highly efficient and 
certain weak attributes that make it less desirable.  Developing and testing each alternate 
mode of dispensing for efficiency in any jurisdiction can be time consuming and 
burdensome especially when LHDs are understaffed to perform day to day activities 
(Santiago, 2006).  The first step would therefore be to create a tool to analyze their 
efficiency in terms of select attributes.   
MAVF is an approach that supports disparate attribute decision-making by taking 
into account the trade-offs a decision maker is willing to make between attributes 
(Belton, 2002).  The process reveals and documents decision makers’ preferences and 
easily determines their points of disagreements; at the same time it can perform marginal 
and sensitivity analysis rapidly under a variety of scenarios.  The first step for MAVF is 
to create an objective hierarchy of attributes.  Since most alternate modes of dispensing 
fall into one of two categories: modes that dispense to the general public and modes that 
dispense to a specific subset of the general population it was necessary to create two 
models in order to maintain attribute independence.  In Model A, speed is an important 
attribute but this was replaced in Model B by the number of people that can be reached 
(since the mode would have a finite cap).  Percent staff reduction (with two sub attributes 
‘Clinical’ and ‘Non-Clinical’) and security (with two sub attributes ‘Site’ and 
‘Transportation’) were attributes that were common in both models.  All three criteria 
influence the final decision as to which alternate mode of dispensing is most viable.  For 
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example, an alternate dispensing option may be very efficient in terms of its speed but 
may have very high security demands, making that option less desirable than another 
with a lower speed but also lower security requirements.   
These models were applied to LAC to test which alternate mode of dispensing 
would have the best overall efficiency as compared to other options.  Therefore each 
alternate mode of dispensing was defined in significant detail as to how it would look like 
in LAC.  The data for each alternate mode of dispensing are collected through careful 
review of journal articles, attendance at exercises as evaluators, after-action reports and 
information available online. These quantified values were standardized using individual 
value function so that all measurements were defined between 0 and 1 with common unit 
values, thus making attributes cross comparable.  The upper and lower bounds of 
performance were set at points where a performance above or below provided no added 
benefit to overall efficiency.  Relative Importance or the weights for each attribute were 
set by a committee comprised of experts from Public Health, Emergency Medical 
Services (EMS), Law Enforcement and Fire Departments.  The information was entered 
into an Excel spreadsheet along with assessed weights to calculate overall effectiveness. 
According to our baseline analysis the door to door dispensing option followed 
closely by the pharmacy option were the two best options for mass prophylaxis to the 
general population.  Both options provided 100% reduction in staffing and a speed of 
dispensing that was much higher than that of a POD.  The drive-thru dispensing option, 
which seemed to be the most popular option according to our literature review, was the 
worst option by far failing to perform well on any attribute.  The Pharmacy Option was 
the only option that provided any added benefit in terms of security.  The model was 
rerun using security and weight input of law enforcement officials only.  According to the 
law enforcement input the top two options in Model A were left unchanged, however the 
overall efficiency of the pharmacy option was lower as it no longer provided added 
benefit in terms of security.  According to the one way sensitivity analysis in terms of 
security weights it is hard to justify the number one option when security weight was low 
to medium, however when security weight was significantly high the pharmacy option 
was clearly the better option.  This trend was reversed for the weights of speed of 
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dispensing.  The changes in weights of percent staff reduction did not affect the output.  
These results were confirmed by a two way sensitivity analysis.  The drive thru option 
under no circumstance was an efficient option.  Assumptions made in Model A, such as 
the number of pharmacies dispensing prophylaxis in the pharmacy option, the number of 
postal carriers available in the postal option and changes in POD baseline were also 
tested and had no impact on the outcome.  This showed that the results obtained from 
Model A were robust and applicable. 
Similarly, Model B was tested at baseline and based on security weights.  The 
Civil Service Option and the Kaiser Permanente Option were the two best options in both 
circumstances.  According to the one way sensitivity analysis, Kaiser Permanente Option 
was replaced by the Hospital POD option when security weights were extremely high and 
was replaced by the Business POD option when the weights on maximum numbers 
reached was extremely high.  Nevertheless, according to the two way sensitivity analysis, 
the Civil Service Option and the Kaiser Permanente Option were the most efficient 
options according to all possible combinations of attributes.  The outputs were not 
affected by any assumptions.  This showed that the results obtained from Model B were 
robust and applicable. 
The analysis and results provided in this paper represent the public health point of 
view.  It is highly recommended that LHDs involve all stakeholders as they are 
developing their objective hierarchies in order to obtain buy in from all partners.  Doing 
so will make the results acceptable to all and make implementation of the findings much 
easier.  If LHDs choose to develop portfolios of alternate modes of dispensing they must 
take double counting of numbers into account in order to accurately estimate the number 
of people that can be reached using the portfolio.  It is highly recommended that LHDs 
consider implementing a SIPs plan due to the uniqueness of the population served by this 
option.  Finally, this paper does not take into account the costs of preplanning or 
implementation, it does conduct a cost-benefit analysis of alternate modes of dispensing 
nor does it take into account legal issues that may hider the implementation of alternate 
modes of dispensing.  These issues require further research before alternate modes of 
dispensing are implemented. 
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Nevertheless, based on the robustness of our results in this paper we can thus 
conclude that alternate modes of dispensing reduce the pressure on PODs in two ways.  
One, by reducing the number of people that go to PODs and two, by reducing the 
pressure on limited resources such as security and staffing.  As seen in this paper, MAVF 
can provide decision makers with an important tool to compare disparate attributes.  The 
process takes into account the relative importance of each attribute according to the 
decision maker and provides recommendations, quickly and efficiently, as to which 
alternate mode of dispensing would be most resourceful.  This lets decision makers 
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Survey Part II – Determining Relative Importance 
 
A.  How would you divide 20 poker chips among the three categories stated below (based on their 
relative importance according to your professional experience)?  (Write or type in numbers, should add 
up to 20) 
 
1. Speed of Delivery  -  _________ Chips 
(Speed – Defined as the number of people dispensed to per hour per site) 
 
2. % Staff Reduction - _________ Chips 
(% Staff Reduction – Defined as staffing requirements lowered by what percent if the given 
alternate mode of dispensing is used) 
 
3. Security Associated with the Option - _________ Chips 
(Security – Defined as the security rating for the alternate dispensing process) 
 
B.  How would you divide 20 poker chips among the three categories stated below (based on their 
relative importance according to your professional experience)?  (Write or type in numbers, should add 
up to 20) 
 
1. Maximum Number Reached  -  _________ Chips 
(Number of people reached – Defined as how many people can be reached using a given option) 
 
2. % Staff Reduction - _________ Chips 
(% Staff Reduction – Defined as staffing requirements lowered by what percent if the given 
alternate mode of dispensing is used) 
 
3. Security Associated with the Option - _________ Chips 
(Security – Defined as the security rating for the alternate dispensing process) 
 
C.  How would you divide 20 poker chips between the following two categories stated below (based 
on their relative importance according to your professional experience)?  (Write or type in numbers, 
should add up to 20) 
 
1. %Clinical Staff Reduction  -  _________ Chips 
(% Clinical Staff Reduction – Defined as clinical staffing requirements lowered by what percent if 
the given alternate mode of dispensing is used) 
 
2. % Non - Clinical Staff Reduction  - _________ Chips 
(% Non - Clinical Staff Reduction – Defined as non-clinical staffing requirements lowered by 
what percent if the given alternate mode of dispensing is used) 
 
D.  How would you divide 20 poker chips between the following two categories stated below (based 
on their relative importance according to your professional experience)?  (Write or type in numbers, 
should add up to 20) 
 
1. Transportation Security  -  _________ Chips 
(Transportation Security – Defined as the security rating for transportation as required by the 
alternate mode of dispensing) 
 
2. Site Security  - _________ Chips 
(Site Security – Defined as the security rating for the physical site as required by the alternate 
mode of dispensing) 
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